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ABSTRACT 
 
Derek A. Epp: Information Processing and the Instability of Political Outcomes. 
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner) 
 
Studies in public policy document what is described as a ‘punctuation equilibrium’ 
pattern of change, where negative feedback forces that act to maintain the status-quo are 
occasionally disrupted, leading to brief and dramatic changes before a new equilibrium is rapidly 
established. The causal process that explains this pattern rests on fundamental limitations to 
human cognition and institutional capacity and as such, is thought to be widely applicable across 
organizational structures. From this perspective, punctuations are inevitable to the policymaking 
process, rather than rare, idiosyncratic events. In this dissertation, I search for the limits of the 
punctuated equilibrium framework by identifying conditions under which proportional, as 
opposed to punctuated, change is possible. I identify variance across organizations in their ability 
to process and respond to new information and by leveraging this variance, interrogate the causal 
mechanism behind punctuated equilibrium; using data from U.S. government budgets with 
corporate and financial data points as reference. I identify two factors as having a powerful effect 
on the stability of outputs– the scope of organizational focus and the degree to which 
organizations take a decentralized, or market-based, approach to decision-making. When 
organizations are sufficiently limited in scope or decentralize decision-making, output 
distributions show fewer extreme changes. The dissertation argues that these conditions are not 
especially uncommon. The implication is that highly punctuated change distributions, while 
certainly abundant in the public sector, are not inevitable to human decision-making processes.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
President Eisenhower was dismissive. Having been briefed on the R-7 Semyorka, the 
Soviet Union’s powerful new rocket, he was well aware that the U.S.S.R. was capable of putting 
a satellite into orbit. In a press conference shortly after Sputnik’s 1957 launch, Eisenhower 
attempted to reassure the American people, conceding that the Soviets had “put one small ball in 
the air,” but quickly adding “I wouldn’t believe that at this moment you have to fear the 
intelligence aspects of this.” Later, his chief of staff Sherman Adams would liken the satellite 
launch to “one shot in an outer-space basketball game.” What the Eisenhower Administration 
had underestimated was the deep almost visceral reaction Americans had to news of the satellite. 
It was disconcerting on two levels. First, it was clearly inconsistent with the prevailing notion 
that the Soviet Union was a technological backwater, incapable of matching the United States’ 
economic or scientific prowess. Second, people were skeptical of Eisenhower’s assurance that 
they had nothing to fear. Radio stations had broadcast the satellite’s signal as it traveled over 
America and it seemed obvious that something that so easily violated transnational boundaries 
presented security risks.  
 During the ensuing media frenzy, the Eisenhower Administration would rethink its initial 
restraint. Clearly a major undertaking was needed to reassure the public that America, although 
second out of the gate, was not going to lose the space race. Change came quickly. Within a year 
Eisenhower would sign legislation creating the Advanced Research Project Agency, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, and passing the National Defense Education Act, which 
allocated billions of dollars to helping students go to college to get degrees in math and science. 
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By 1961 when President Kennedy gave his famous speech about putting an American on the 
moon, U.S. outlays toward space flight and technology, a budget category that scarcely existed in 
the early 1950s, had already increased 10-fold from their 1957 levels. Altogether, from the 
launch of Sputnik to the moon-landing in 1969, U.S. outlays toward space technology would 
increase by almost 5,000 percent.  
 Dramatic in size and the speed with which they are enacted, spending “punctuations” of 
the kind described above are actually very common to government budgets. Look at almost any 
U.S. budget category for the last 50 years and you will encounter at least one massive 
adjustment, where the amount of money the government is spending changes by upward of 75 
percent from one year to the next. These adjustments are not always toward increases in 
spending. Returning to the space flight example, NASA directors, triumphant over their recent 
successes, must have been chagrin in the early 1970s when, with the space race decisively won 
for America, politicians in Washington cut NASA’s budget more than 50 percent. Budget 
instability works in both positive and negative directions.  
 What causes these punctuations? Further, why are punctuations non-constant across 
policy domains so that some policies persist, remaining the status quo for decades, while others 
undergo frequent adjustments? It is tempting to treat each punctuation as an isolated, one-off 
event. Surely, the best way to explain the dramatic increases in spending on science and 
technology in the 1960s is by reference to the Cold War and Sputnik. On a case by case basis, a 
historical approach may indeed be best, but the abundance of punctuations in budgetary time 
series demands a general causal explanation. Punctuations are endemic to the policymaking 
process, not rare, idiosyncratic events. Any attempt to characterize the nature of policy making in 
modern democracies must offer a systematic account of their existence. This dissertation 
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provides such an explanation by describing the causes of political instability. It focuses on the 
information processing capacity of governments and mass publics, which determine their ability 
to respond promptly and sufficiently to societal issues. The key finding is that instabilities vary 
substantially along two dimensions – the scope of governmental focus and the degree to which 
governments take a decentralized, or market-based, approach to decision-making. When 
governments are operating in comparatively simple policy domains or decentralize decision 
making, public policies tend to endure and change is a smooth, gradual process. When issues are 
complex or decision making is highly centralized, policy change is stochastic and punctuations 
abundant.  
Background 
The first large-scale study to investigate the causes of political instabilities is The Politics 
of Attention, where Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner (2005) show that government spending 
follows a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ pattern of change. By this they mean that annual adjustments 
to government spending are predominantly small (ranging between -3 and 3 percent), but that 
occasionally the government undertakes enormous spending reallocations. This pattern is seen as 
a direct consequence of disproportionate information processing. The idea is that limitations to 
governmental attention inevitably cause over-attention to a relatively small number of items and 
under-attention to the bulk of issues that fail to cross some threshold of urgency and therefore 
gain attention. Over time, as issues rise and fall in urgency, individual and institutional attention 
shift not slowly and proportionately, but in jumps and starts. If policymaking follows the 
allocation of attention, then there will be incremental drift when attention is allocated elsewhere, 
as it is hard to justify a massive budget change in the absence of attention, and the possibility—
though no certainty—of dramatic changes in those cases where attention is focused on a topic 
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where some urgency or crisis seems apparent. 
 By this logic, political instability can be closely linked to information processing. In a 
political system that processes information proportionally, there would be neither under nor 
over-attention to issues. Instead, issues would be addressed comprehensively, receiving attention 
in exact relation to the size of the underlying problem. As issues would not be ignored, or slip 
through the cracks, there would be no need for massive policy adjustments to correct issues that 
have worsened through inattention. Of course, a government that could process information at 
this high level is unlikely, even difficult to imagine. It comes as no surprise that the punctuated 
equilibrium pattern Jones and Baumgartner describe appears to be widely applicable, aptly 
characterizing the distribution of outputs from a wide variety of organizational decision making 
processes. In fact, the reasons to expect disequilibria are so strong that Jones and Baumgartner 
developed the General Punctuation Hypothesis (2005), which simply states that the outputs of 
any complex human decision making process will feature punctuations.  
 While fully proportional, or comprehensive, information processing may be unattainable 
we can still expect considerable variance across governments and organizations in their ability to 
process and respond to new information. The dissertation leverages this variance to interrogate 
the causal mechanism of the punctuated equilibrium framework. If policy instabilities result from 
attention scarcities, then when attention is less scarce, policy making should stabilize. This basic 
prediction has undergone little in the way of systematic testing. The General Punctuation 
Hypothesis provides a powerful explanation for an outcome (political instabilities), but rarely is 
applied to explaining variance in that outcome. Rather, the Hypothesis is based on a broad 
theoretical framework, the underlying mechanics of which have never been fully unpacked. That 
is the goal of this dissertation. To search for the limits of the punctuated equilibrium result by 
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identifying the conditions under which proportional, as opposed to punctuated, change is 
possible. In doing so, it seeks to provide a rigorous test of the applicability and explanatory 
power of the General Punctuation Hypothesis.  
What Does Information Processing Mean? 
Information processing is a prerequisite of decision making and takes place over two 
distinct stages. The first involves receiving new information and the second requires 
comprehension of that information. Basic requirements for information processing are therefore: 
a) access to information b) time to consider the information and c) the expertise or intellect to 
comprehend the information. Individuals or organizations with a high capacity to process 
information easily meet the requirements. On the other hand, a low capacity to process 
information results from difficulty meeting one or all three requirements. For example, as 
individuals, we are often faced with decisions so complex that we lack the time to process all the 
potentially relevant information. Or we may be faced with a decision in an area where we have 
no prior experience, making it difficult to make sense of the information we are receiving.  
           One factor that clearly influences the information processing capacity of individuals or 
organizations is the scope of information that may be relevant to making a particular decision. 
Processing information relevant to simple tasks, such as deciding what to eat for breakfast, is not 
particularly burdensome and can be achieved at a high level by almost everyone. On the other 
hand, processing the information relevant to governing a country is more difficult by several 
orders of magnitude. Further, decisions are often required where there is no relevant information 
to begin with, or the available information is inaccurate. In these cases, uncertainty can cause 
individuals to pursue courses of action that are suboptimal given the reality of the issues at hand. 
In all, the capacity to process information will vary by individual, or organization, and from one 
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decision making process to the next.  
 A political system, as I use the term, refers to the combination of the mass public and the 
institutions within a country that affect political outcomes. Exploring the causes of instability in 
the U.S. political system requires accounting for the information processing capacity of both the 
government and the public. The chapter proceeds by reviewing literature that addresses the 
ability of the U.S. political system to meet each of the three information processing 
requirements. Next, I explain the logic and key findings of the punctuated equilibrium 
framework, including the empirical evidence and methods associated with the subfield. I 
conclude by presenting the theoretical contributions of the dissertation and outlining the chapters 
to follow. 
Accessing Information 
Is relevant political information available to the government and public? An economic 
perspective would emphasize that, like any consumer good, information comes with costs. For 
individuals to be informed about politics they may have to subscribe to a newspaper or pay a 
cable subscription fee. In the Downsian account of democracy, information costs are a key driver 
of political inequality (Downs 1957). For its part, the government has clearly devoted 
considerable fiscal resources to information-gathering through the development of organizations 
such as the Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office.  
           In fact, information is often plentiful and increasingly the costs of accessing quality 
information are shrinking, so finding time to sort through and prioritize information relevant to a 
decision is often more troublesome than accessing the information in the first place. In his 1996 
Participation in Congress, Richard Hall writes that “policy-relevant information is abundant, 
perhaps embarrassingly rich, on Capitol Hill” (90). Even events that take the country by surprise 
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in retrospect often appear less random, even predictable. One of the more disturbing findings of 
the 9/11 Commission is that there was actually good evidence that a hijacking plot was in the 
works and that this evidence was available to the CIA. Of course, the advantage of hindsight is 
that we know how information should have been prioritized, but in the crush of current events 
critical information can be lost or ignored. It is often the case that too much, not too little, 
information is the problem.  
Considering Information  
Access to information is the first step in information processing. For that information to 
be useful it must be prioritized. That is, institutions or individuals must be able to consider and 
deliberate over the information they have received. Consideration takes time and agenda space, 
both of which are scarce commodities. Herbert Simon, writing about governance, notes that “the 
environment makes parallel demands on the system, but the system can only respond serially” 
(1977, 157). In other words, problems requiring legislative action will often occur 
simultaneously and in no predictable or convenient order, but governments can only address 
them one at a time. Many scholars have remarked on the overwhelming complexity of 
governance and noted that national agendas tend to be limited to a few highly salient topics only, 
at the expense of many seemingly important issues (Sigelman and Buell 2004, Walgrave and 
Nuytemans 2009, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, Baumgartner et al. 2011). In many 
ways, governance is not a carefully planned endeavor, but a reactive enterprise with the pressing 
concerns of the day dominating the agenda.  
             Consider that during George W. Bush’s presidency, we saw a major expansion of 
government through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and, with the 2007 
stimulus package, one of the largest government interventions into the economy in U.S. history. 
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Ideologically these are not actions typically associated with the Republican Party, but they were 
seen as reasonable, if not necessary, responses to the September 11th attacks and the 2007 
financial crises. Agendas, carefully planned and promoted during elections, are quickly 
sidetracked by the demands of responsible governance, with particularly significant events, such 
as wars or recessions, occupying an inordinate amount of agenda space.       
 Beyond changing political and economic realities, to which parties must respond 
regardless of ideology, there are system-level factors that constrain political agendas. Much has 
been written about the institutional “rules of the game” and their effect on agendas. One clear 
example is the closed-primary system, which contributes to polarization and gridlock in 
Congress, therefore limiting the number of issues to which the government can attend. Other 
constraints include the dual-chambered legislature, congressional gatekeepers, the presidential 
veto, and a demanding election schedule (Bish 1973; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Cox and 
McCubbins 2005; Koger 2006; Oleszek 2010). In each case, these factors limit the overall 
‘carry-capacity’ of the system. For the most part, the U.S. government moves as it was designed 
to do by the founders: slowly.  
 A more ubiquitous agenda constraint is the limitations of human cognition. Jones and 
Baumgartner identify bounded rationality - basic constraints in the way people process and 
respond to new information - as the primary cause of disproportionate information processing. 
People may be rational in their pursuit of goals, but they have selective attention spans and 
limited short-term memories (Simon 1983; Thorngate 1988). To reconcile cognitive limits with a 
complex world, people develop heuristics whereby decisions are based on habit or underlying 
patterns (Margolis 1987). These heuristics are helpful cognitive short-cuts that allow people to 
bypass a great deal of non-essential information. Instead of processing and responding to all the 
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information that is relevant to a particular decision, people selectively weigh only a few key 
factors.  
             George Miller famously characterized the extent of the problem: “There is a clear and 
definite limit to the accuracy with which we can identify absolutely the magnitude of a 
unidimensional stimulus variable. I would propose to call this limit the span of absolute 
judgment, and I maintain that for unidimensional judgments this span is usually somewhere in 
the neighborhood of seven” (1956, 90). Put simply, Miller’s point is that people can only process 
around seven unique stimuli at a time. In all, during any decision making process a great deal of 
pertinent information is never actively considered (Simon, 1947, 1999; Jones, 1994, 1999, 2001). 
For these reasons, finding the agenda space to attend to information can be seen as a more 
problematic requirement of information processing than accessing information in the first place. 
Comprehending Information  
The challenge of interpreting so much diverse information is considerable and 
organizations develop strategies, both structural and procedural, to facilitate the task. An 
example from the U.S. Congress is the committee structure, which is designed to create niche 
areas of expertise. Not every member of Congress can be an expert on every issue, but by 
dividing attention across committees, collectively Congress can exercise proficiency on a wide 
range of topics. This kind of parallel-processing allows organizations to make many decisions 
routinely, without the need for comprehensive oversight. The U.S. government executes many 
decisions simultaneously by delegating the authority to make these decisions across various 
cabinet departments and congressional committees. To a limited extent, people are also capable 
of parallel-processing. Remember that Miller put the limits on cognition at around 6 individual 
stimuli, which leaves ample room for people to consider issues simultaneously.    
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 Divisions of labor that allow for parallel-processing come with both financial and, in the 
case of the U.S. government many would argue, normative costs. One consequence is that 
members of Congress have incentives to form close relationships with interest group lobbyists 
who, having made a career working in a certain industry, have developed a great deal of specific 
knowledge, which they are happy to share with members. Together members of Congress and 
lobbyists will develop “policy subsystems” – small groups of political actors who monopolize 
the discussion over a particular issue (Griffith 1961; Redford 1969; Walker 1983; Chubb 1985). 
(Such arrangements are also known as iron triangles, policy networks, subsystem politics, and 
policy whirlpools.) The tendency for policy making to devolve into the purview of isolated 
subgroups has been seen as a problematic feature of modern democracy. If most policy decisions 
are made behind closed doors, with little public input, it raises questions about whose interests 
are being represented by government (Schattschneider 1960). Policy subsystems can be seen as a 
direct and inevitable consequence of a system that requires the comprehension of a vast array of 
information. If running the national government were less complicated, there would be no need 
for the divisions of labor that encourage subsystem development.     
 Parallel-processing allows organizations to skirt the limits of attention, but at some point 
those limits will be confronted. Bureaucracies are designed to process routine decisions, but 
major new initiatives or decisions about controversial topics will have to be decided by a central 
governing authority. This is when organizations shift from parallel to serial-information 
processing, as responsibility for making decisions moves from multitudes of bureaucratic 
employees to a much smaller subset of organizational leaders. In other words, this is when 
agenda setting takes place. The U.S. government, for example, makes thousands of decisions 
routinely, but implementing new public policy or redirecting bureaucratic focus requires 
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centralized decision-making, either by the President or party leaders in Congress. At this point, 
the cognitive limits of people in leadership positions come into play. In sum, attention can be 
stretched by bureaucratic divisions of labor, but only so far. Even for complex organizations, 
attention is a scarce commodity.  
Punctuated Equilibrium  
What happens in a political system where attention can be allocated to only a very small 
subset of issues at any given time? What will policy change look like? McCubbins and Schwartz 
(1984) popularized the term “fire-alarm oversight” to characterize the nature of governance 
under conditions of attention scarcity. The idea is that policymakers only have time to deal with 
crises. Anything less than a full-blown crisis and the issue will be left off the agenda, as in most 
modern societies there are enough crises to fully occupy the government’s limited attention. Of 
course, there are many issues that might not rise to crisis-level, but would still benefit from 
government attention. These issues will be ignored, and worsen through inattention, until they 
become crises in their own right. Note that there is nothing objective about assigning urgency to 
some issues over others. History is full of examples where governments took unprecedented 
steps to alleviate a perceived crisis that in retrospect looks trivial or nonexistent. Likewise, some 
contemporary issues look very urgent, but are still being ignored. Regardless of the selection 
mechanism, because agenda space is limited, issues must displace each other as they rise and fall 
in urgency.   
Crises demand action, so when issues do make it on the agenda there is the potential for 
major policy adjustments. There is also the possibility that government deliberations end in 
gridlock and nothing will be accomplished, no matter how dire a situation appears. Even with 
attention, policy change is no certainly. Still, the likelihood for major changes is greater where 
 12 
 
attention is focused. Absent any attention, it is hard to imagine how or why large shifts would be 
enacted. This dichotomy, or threshold effect, is the basis of the punctuated equilibrium model. 
Without attention, policies change only marginally from year to year, but when attention is 
focused policy punctuations are possible.        
 The punctuated equilibrium model was originally developed to explain policy change at 
the national level, but the model’s theoretical roots are grounded in a basic understanding of 
human cognition.  Certainly attention can be considered an important prerequisite for change in 
many contexts and taking the implications of bounded rationality seriously suggests attention 
scarcities are widespread. This led Jones and Baumgartner to formulate the General Punctuation 
Hypothesis, which predicts that the result of any complex human decision making process will 
be punctuated. A broad prediction, subsequent scholarship has supported the hypothesis, finding 
evidence of disequilibria across a wide range of political time series, including congressional 
hearings, bill passages, media coverage, and the budgets of city and local governments (Jordan 
2006; Breunig and Koski 2006; Jones et.al. 2009; Boydstun 2013).  
Empirical Methods 
The punctuated equilibrium model was originally developed and tested using a historical, 
case-study approach.  The strategy was to track policy changes to individual topics over time in 
order to illustrate the agenda dynamics thought to cause policy punctuations (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993). Today the literature emphasizes a distributional, or stochastic approach, which 
rather than asking why an individual policy series saw a punctuation, focuses on identifying 
aggregate patterns of change across time and multiple issues domains. Conclusions drawn from 
this literature have tended to be sweeping in scope, characterizing the nature of policy making at 
the broadest level. Testing a broad hypothesis requires expansive data and a common focus in the 
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literature is government budgets, which provide a good approximation of the relative importance 
governments place on different issues. The added benefit is that for many Western democracies 
budget data is plentiful, facilitating international comparison. 
 What does a punctuated equilibrium pattern of change look like? Figure 1.1 shows annual 
percentage changes in spending on public transportation by the federal government, from 1947 
through 2012. There are substantial reallocations in the early 1950s, corresponding to 
development of the interstate system by the Eisenhower Administration, but clearly all other 
changes are dwarfed by the reallocation that took place in 1974. Seen as a means of combating 
urban blight, the Community Development Block Grant program was signed into law by 
President Ford after receiving bipartisan support in Congress. A major component of the 
program was to develop public transit systems, allowing residents in poorer neighborhoods to 
commute to jobs in more affluent urban centers. From one year to the next federal transportation 
outlays increased by over 300 percent. Usually transportation is not seen as a particularity 
pressing issue, but in the early 1970s it was momentarily viewed as a solution to what, at the 
time, was considered a serious problem.  
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Figure 1.1. Percent Change in Federal Transportation Outlays, 1947 – 2012 
 
 Of course, the federal government allocates money to many different programs besides 
transportation. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of annual percentage changes in spending across 
all 67 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) categories (called subfunctions in OMB 
parlance), from 1947 through 2012. This is a simple update of the Jones-Baumgartner figure 
4.14, which started the discussion about punctuations in budgets (2005, 111).   
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Figure 1.2. Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes Across OMB Subfunctions, 1947 – 2012 
 
Clearly this distribution is not normal, but instead can be described as leptokurtic. 
(Superimposed over the budget distribution is a normal distribution, for comparison.) 
Leptokurtic change distributions are considered a key indicator of a government that is 
processing information disproportionately. This type of distribution has much wider tails and 
higher central peaks than would be produced by a normal data-generating process, and the 
“shoulders”, or mid-range changes, are missing. The high central peak is caused by widespread 
under-attention to issues, which leads to incremental budgeting, and the wide tails result from 
decisive government reallocations on issues where there is a sense of urgency. The l-kurtosis 
statistic measures the degree to which a distribution displays leptokurtosis. A normal distribution 
has an l-kurtosis of 0.123, with increasing values indicating leptokurtosis and lower values 
playkurtosis. Note that the budget distribution in the figure has an l-kurtosis value of around 
0.620, indicating that it deviates substantially from the Normal (Jones et.al. 2009).  
            Based on the huge range of activities that might occupy a national government, the 
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punctuated equilibrium model assumes that annual changes to the overall inputs associated with 
governing are normally distributed, from the Central Limit Theorem. In this way the budget 
distribution tells us something about how efficiently the government is at processing and 
responding to problem, as we can expect that a perfectly efficient government would adjust 
spending proportionally to inputs, thus generating a normal spending distribution. 
 The dissertation employs a multitude of methods, but a key analytic approach will be to 
compare the shape of output distributions. If punctuations result from attention scarcities, then in 
conditions where attention is less scarce, output distributions should trend toward the normal. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the expected dynamic. When attention is scarce and narrowly focused the 
dichotomy between marginal drift and policy punctuations should be especially acute; 
corresponding to a higher central peak and wider tails. As information is processed more 
proportionally, organizational outputs will more closely resemble the distribution of relevant 
inputs, which is assumed to be normally distributed. 
Figure 1.3. Relationship between Information Processing and Output Distributions  
 
The empirical scope of the dissertation is broad, with data from the 1940s through 2012 
on a variety of government, public, and corporate outputs, but the focus is narrow. With each 
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dataset, hypotheses are derived and tests conducted to determine how political instability varies 
with attention. 
Theoretical Expectations 
Given what we know about information processing and how it affects policymaking, 
what factors are most likely to condition the stability of organizational outputs? That is, what 
factors will be the biggest contributors to punctuations? The preceding scholarship offers some 
clues. First, returning to studies on bounded rationality, while there are clearly upper limits to 
human cognition, there are also lower limits. If it takes 6 or more stimuli to overwhelm human 
cognition, forcing people to fall back on heuristics, where decisions feature fewer than 6 
alternatives, people should be able sort through those alternatives in a fairly comprehensive 
manner. At issue, in other words, is complexity. When decisions are very simple, comprehensive 
information processing is not so prohibitive. 
 Granted, 6 is a low number given the diversity of issues faced by modern governments. 
Policymakers in Washington are obviously confronted with many more than 6 issues to worry 
about at any given time, so it seems unlikely that we will ever observe a government that 
processes information comprehensively across the board, even with bureaucratic divisions of 
labor. Still, we can expect considerable variance in the degree to which complexity will be at 
issue across policy domains. I take a two-pronged approach to understanding complexity. The 
first dimension is “natural” or real-world complexity, which simply acknowledges that some 
policy domains are by nature less complicated than others. Social Security payments, or other 
forms of “old-age insurance”, are based on changing age demographics, for example. Figure 1.4 
gives an example, tracking in millions the number of people in the U.S. age 65 or older, from 
1940 through 2010. 
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Figure 1.4. U.S. Population Age 65 and Older  
 
 As an indicator, age demographics are as well-behaved as a policymaker could ever hope 
for and determining outlays for policies linked to changing demographics should be relatively 
straightforward. Contrast Social Security with policy domains related to disaster relief or farm 
price supports, where the relevant inputs are highly stochastic. Figure 1.5 shows normalized 
hurricane damages in the U.S., from 1900 through 2005. While age demographics showed a 
clear, steadily increasing trend, there is no apparent trend with hurricane damages. Instead, the 
size of the damage fluctuates widely from year to year. 
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Figure 1.5. Normalized Hurricane Damages
 
 If climate models were vastly superior, then policymakers might have forewarning about 
particularly powerful hurricanes years in advance, allowing them to budget for these disasters 
incrementally. Of course, the complexities of weather events are such that accurately predicting 
next week’s weather is challenging; to say nothing of predicting specific hurricanes years before 
they happen. Faced with such complexity, what do policymakers do? They cross their fingers 
and hope that no major disasters take place on their watch and when a disaster does occur, they 
allocate spending to address the crisis. We can consider instability that results from natural 
complexity to be reactive, in the sense that policymakers are forced to quickly respond to an 
unforeseen, or newly discovered, crisis.  
 The other type of complexity is political in origin. This dimension acknowledges that 
there are no true equilibria in politics. Rather, there are various problems in search of solutions 
and solutions in search of problems (Kingdon 1984; Cohen et.al. 1972). As political conflicts 
play out, problems and solutions will pair off, creating status quos that may endure for decades, 
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but are ultimately fragile. When new ideas or issue frames come to dominate thinking about a 
particular problem, large policy changes can result, as the government readjusts its focus. This 
type of complexity, famously described by Kingdon’s “three streams approach”, is a major focus 
in the agenda setting literature. 
 As discussed, given institutional constraints and the restrictive boundaries of human 
cognition, finding a government that comprehensively processes all the information relevant to 
policymaking is unlikely. But the General Punctuation Hypothesis makes claims beyond just the 
public sector, predicting that the results of any human decision making process will be 
punctuated. Might there be organizations whose focus is so narrow that they can effectively 
process all the information relevant to their decision-making processes? It is an open question 
(one that the dissertation will pursue), but it seems likely given the wide range of organizational 
interests in today’s society.  
 Another factor that might powerfully affect the stability of organizational outputs is the 
degree to which organizations employ a decentralized, or market-based, decision-making 
process. Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) showed that distributions of changes in stock market 
returns were approximately normal. Markets returns are a common, and much lauded, product of 
human-decision making, so this finding represents an important caveat the General Punctuation 
Hypothesis. The hypothesis applies only to the outputs of people or organizations operating in 
isolation. Once we start aggregating across autonomous decision-making units, outputs appear to 
stabilize and punctuations become much less frequent. Why should this be the case? What is the 
distinction between market-based and centralized decision making?  
 Jones et.al. emphasize that modern stock markets are characterized by relatively low 
transaction and information costs, so the institutional constraints imposed by markets are 
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considerably less than those seen in government. Most important, however, is that markets gain 
by aggregation. Each individual actor in a market system has an effect on the final outcome, so 
idiosyncratic or random behavior by actors who are uninformed averages out, leaving a clear, 
sophisticated signal from the actors who are reacting to some common stimuli. There is, in other 
words, a powerful empirical reason why market systems are better at processing information than 
individuals.            
 For illustration, imagine that every day some investors sell their shares in a certain stock 
for various personal reasons; perhaps they have a major purchase on the horizon. Conversely, 
other people may decide to diversify their investments and purchase the stock. Since this 
behavior is random, it will average out, with the people buying new shares making up for the 
deficit caused by people who sold their shares. Now imagine that the company selling the shares 
announces that quarterly revenues were lower than expected. This sends a strong signal to 
investors that the company is not performing as well as hoped, that perhaps more bad news is on 
the horizon, and that it might be time to devest. This is an actual signal, not random noise, so we 
can expect it will not average out, but instead cause share prices to immediately adjust to a lower 
level. If we were to sample any random person’s decision making process in regard to buying or 
selling the stock, it is unclear what we would find. Idiosyncrasies abound, and it is always 
possible that the person in question was not paying attention and missed the signal altogether, in 
which case there is no reason to expect the person will do anything at all. Likewise, looking at 
any single organization in isolation, various political or institutional conditions will affect the 
way that organization interprets signals, or as is often the case with national governments, signals 
will become lost in the tidal wave of incoming information.   
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 The ability of markets to process information at a very high level is well-known and often 
expressed in terms of the “efficient-market hypothesis”, which asserts that it is almost impossible 
to consistently ‘beat’ average market returns because prices on traded assets already reflect 
virtually all the information relevant to buying or selling (Samuelson 1965; Fama 1970). This 
does not mean markets are infallible – they do not operate with perfect information and a ‘herd-
mentality’ can occasionally lead to speculative economic bubbles (Basu 1977). Still, while the 
degree to which markets are perfectly efficient is debated, we can reasonably expect that an open 
market system will process information more completely than isolated organizations.   
 Markets are certainly a central part of social life in modern democracies. What about the 
role of market-based decision making within government? To what extent are market 
mechanisms used to determine policy outcomes? In fact, market structures are not uncommon to 
policymaking. Much of monetary policy, a substantively important component of governance, is 
based on market interactions, and many social policies also feature market components. A recent 
example is the Affordable Care Act, which establishes a marketplace to determine the price of 
health insurance. We can expect that policies where outcomes are generated by a market will see 
fewer punctuations than those where outcomes are determined exclusively by a central decision-
making unit. 
 In sum, there are good reasons to think that these two factors –complexity and the 
centralization of decision-making – will powerfully predict the stability of political outcomes. 
The dissertation proceeds to test this reasoning as follows: Chapter 2 revisits the federal budget, 
the focus of Jones and Baumgartner’s original work, to investigate the specific causes of 
punctuations in budgetary outlays. The emphasis in this chapter is on spending inputs and how 
different budget functions are linked to very different indicators. Some inputs generate 
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dependable and stable information flows, while others are much more erratic, so the occurrence 
of disequilibria in the federal budget is not constant but varies by spending type. By directly 
measuring the distribution of inputs relevant to particular areas of policymaking, the chapter 
avoids making assumptions about how those inputs may be distributed, allowing for a more 
direct testing of the General Punctuation Hypothesis. This exploration informs the specification 
of a logistic regression model and a key contribution is to predict the occurrence of punctuations 
in budgetary time series.  
Informed by these results, Chapter 3 investigates the robustness of punctuation 
equilibrium theory as an explanation for instability in public budgets.  It explores potential 
artifactual causes of punctuations, controls for them, and revaluates distributions of budget data 
when they are eliminated from the analysis. A key theoretical development is to distinguish 
between punctuations that are sustained over many years, versus those that frequently reversed. 
Using U.S. federal budget data as the test case, I find only small differences in the shape of 
spending distribution when budget series prone to temporary punctuations are eliminated.  
            Chapter 4 expands the scope of the analysis to the 50 states and looks at revenue policies. 
The availability of revenues can obviously be an important input when making policy decisions. 
Meanwhile, an important input to revenues is the underlying economy, I measure through GSP. 
The chapter considers: a) how instability in revenues streams lead to punctuations in outlays b) 
how the difficulty of decision-making processes can affect the shape of output distributions c) 
how the composition of tax portfolios affects the stability of revenue distributions.  
            Chapter 5 develops an information processing model for mass publics.  Analysis of 
public opinion data developed by James Stimson (1991) reveals that changes in public opinion 
closely match a punctuated equilibrium pattern of change. Applying the concept of bounded 
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rationality to mass publics suggests that public attention is a scarce and disproportionately 
allocated commodity. Causal analysis of opinion data in relation to media coverage finds that 
large shifts in opinion are much more likely when attention is highly concentrated, but for the 
many issues where attention is absent, opinions drift only marginally. Public opinion is very 
much a ‘sleeping giant’ – predominantly static and at the same time prone to sudden and 
dramatic bursts.  
            Chapter 6 looks at corporate and market data to determine the applicability of the 
punctuated equilibrium framework to the private sector. Conventional wisdom is that the private 
sector is much more efficient than government. This chapter explores how this is and is not true. 
Markets, based on the collective actions of millions of people, are highly efficient, but 
corporations work under the same cognitive constraints as governments (or any other 
organization). A comparison of exchange rates across countries using fixed and free-floating 
rates illustrates this point, as does consideration of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
adopted in some Northeastern states, and the price of air fares before and after deregulation of 
the airline industry.  
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CHAPTER TWO: PREDICTING PUNCTUATIONS 
Scholarship shows instabilities in outputs from governments around the world, but the 
original finding was for the U.S. national government. This is where the dissertation’s search for 
variance begins. It is well-understood that aggregate changes to U.S. government policies display 
frequent punctuations, however, this general finding masks what may be considerable variance 
across policy domains. There is no reason to expect that the government will process information 
in the exact same way, or with the same aptitude, across domains as diverse as Social Security is 
to emergency management. Part of the methodology of this chapter will be an attempt to directly 
measure various inputs that may be relevant to the policymaking process in order to determine if 
instability in the inputs is associated with more punctuations in the outputs, as would be 
expected.  
             Studies in agenda setting have for the most part avoided measuring inputs directly, 
instead relying on the assumption that they will be normally distributed in the aggregate.  This 
avoidance is due primarily to uncertainly as to what the appropriate inputs are; the decision-
making theory at the core of punctuated equilibrium is that decision-makers are never using a 
complete model of reality, and therefore that they may occasionally update their approach. This 
means changing the series of input indicators they consider relevant to a particular issue. Further, 
many of the indicators decision-makers may use will be qualitative and informal.    
 Still, there are clear limitations to the general approach. It necessitates drawing 
conclusions at only the highest levels of aggregation, as the assumption of normally distributed 
inputs breaks down when looking at specific policies. The result is a “black box” at the center of 
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the punctuated equilibrium framework - inputs into a political system are acted upon by 
cognitive and institutional limitations, resulting in punctuated outputs. But where exactly do 
those punctuations come from? Some areas of policy making might be more prone to instability 
than others. Some governing conditions, such as single party government, may result in 
punctuations more frequently than periods of divided control. How much of the instability 
observed in the federal budget can be attributed to political complexity caused by deliberations 
over the merits of competing inputs, versus natural complexity that the government simply reacts 
to? These questions motivate this chapter’s approach: a return to the U.S. federal budget with the 
goal of unpacking the black box at the center of the punctuated equilibrium model. In doing so, it 
offers an extension of the model, by describing the occurrence of punctuations over a range of 
policy domains and conditions, but also a test. Without a firm measure of underlying inputs, a 
key finding in the literature is based on an assumption (albeit a strong one). The chapter, by 
directly measuring inputs, allows a side-by-side comparison of input and output distributions, 
providing a direct test of the General Punctuation Hypothesis. 
Budget Punctuations – The Dependent Variable 
The analysis takes place over two sections. The first develops and tests various 
hypotheses relating to the occurrence of punctuations in U.S. outlays. Data for this analysis 
comes primarily from the Policy Agendas Project, which provides Office of Management and 
Budget datasets that track government outlays across various budget categories (subfunctions in 
OMB parlance) from 1947 to 2012. The analysis also uses a highly detailed budget document 
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which breaks outlays down by the 
government agency authorized to spend the allocated money. The second section develops a 
model to predict the occurrence of budget punctuations using logistic regression.  
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 Before proceeding to subsequent analysis the chapter establishes a definition for what 
constitutes a budget punctuation. Figure 2.1 shows aggregate changes in government spending 
across OMB subfunctions from 1947 to 2012, repeating Figure 1.2 from Chapter 1. The goal 
here is to explain the punctuations in Figure 2.1 and there are various ways to distinguish 
between those cases far in the tails and those not considered to be punctuations. Analysis of the 
causes of punctuations proves to be highly robust with respect to where the line is drawn 
between a punctuated change and one that is closer to the bulk of the observations. For 
simplicity, I draw that line at the top and bottom ten percent of the observed changes, and the 
figure illustrates this with vertical lines. With 3,831 observations in the overall distribution, 783 
then are identified as punctuations, half on the negative side and half on the positive side. Note, 
as is standard in the literature, the presentation of the data is truncated by clustering all extremely 
high positive changes at +150 percent and negative changes at -80 percent.1  
                                                 
1 More complicated definitions of what constitutes a punctuation, such as those beyond the point 
where the observed distribution passes the hypothetical Normal distribution with similar 
variance, or controlling for changes in overall variability across time, generate results highly 
similar to those we present here, so for simplicity, but with knowledge that our results are robust, 
we choose a very simple definition of punctuation here. Various authors have drawn these lines 
differently:  Jones, Baumgartner and True (1998) drew them at +20 and -15; Breunig and Koski 
(2006) have used quintile regression to analyze separately the tails from the center of the 
distribution. 
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Figure 2.1. Identifying Punctuations in the Distribution of Annual Changes in Federal Outlays
 
 How are the punctuations in Figure 2.1 distributed across policy domains? Christian 
Breunig and collaborators showed strong differences in levels of punctuation across policy 
domains in the U.S. federal budget (with l-kurtosis scores ranging from 0.2  for interest on the 
public debt to 0.6 for Medicare) and the Danish national budget (with l-kurtosis scores ranging 
from close to zero for welfare and 0.6 for waterways).  Further, they showed that for the cases 
where the budgets could be compared, the same issue-domains tended to have low or high l-
kurtosis scores in both countries (Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen  2010).  Finally, Breunig and 
Koski (2012) showed similar results looking at a different set of policy comparisons in the 50 US 
states (and also when comparing annual budget totals from state to state); they found education 
spending to be at the low end of the l-kurtosis scale, with parks at the  top. 
           The chapter follows the general pattern of Breunig et al. (2010) here and simply lists, by 
U.S. OMB subfunctional category, the number of positive, negative, and total punctuations in the 
budget series, using the same data from Figure 2.1 above.  Recall that by definition there are 392 
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positive, and 391 negative punctuations. Here, we see that topics driven by exogenous shocks 
tend to have the most punctuations (disaster relief, farm support), while those topics associated 
with mandatory programs have fewer (Social Security, Medicare).  
Table 2.1. Punctuations by OMB Subfunction  
OMB Subfunction  Positive Punctuations Negative Punctuations  Total 
Disaster Relief and Insurance  21 22 43 
Military – Other  16 19 35 
Farm Income Stabilization 14 19 33 
General Property and Records  
     Management 
16 16 32 
Other Advancement of  
     Commerce 
13 16 29 
Other General Government 13 13 26 
Veterans Education, Training,  
     and Rehabilitation 
9 18 26 
International Security Assistance 12 14 26 
Community Development 13 12 25 
Higher Education 15 10 25 
Housing Assistance 12 12 24 
International Development and  
     Humanitarian Assistance 
13 11 24 
Area and Regional Development 9 15 24 
Unemployment Compensation 12 9 21 
Training and Employment 12 9 21 
Defense-related Activities 12 9 21 
Criminal Justice Assistance 8 9 17 
Ground Transportation 8 7 15 
General Purpose Fiscal  
     Assistance 
7 7 14 
Research and General Education  
     Aids 
7 7 14 
Emergency Energy Preparedness 5 9 14 
Water Resources 5 8 13 
Elementary, Secondary, and  
     Vocational Education 
7 6 13 
Space Flight, Research, and  
     Supporting Activities 
9 4 13 
Military Construction  4 9 13 
Pollution Control and Abatement 6 6 12 
General Retirement and  
     Disability 
4 7 11 
Atomic Energy Defense  
     Activities 
6 5 11 
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Conservation and Land  
     Management 
5 6 11 
Executive Direction and  
     Management 
7 4 11 
Recreational Resources 7 4 11 
General Purpose Management 5 5 10 
Energy Information, Policy, and  
     Regulation 
3 7 10 
Energy Conservation 3 7 10 
General Science and Basic  
     Research 
7 3 10 
Air Transportation 5 4 9 
Social Services 6 2 8 
Health Care Services 5 3 8 
Conduct of Foreign Affairs 4 4 8 
Food and Nutrition Assistance 7 0 7 
Other Labor Services 2 5 7 
Federal Law Enforcement  
     Activities 
4 2 6 
Federal Employee Retirement  
     and Disability 
3 2 5 
Other Veterans Benefits and  
     Services 
3 2 5 
Water Transportation 2 3 5 
Legislative Functions 3 2 5 
Military (1947-1956) 2 2 4 
Military Family Housing  0 4 4 
Federal Correctional Activities  3 1 4 
Other Natural Resources 3 1 4 
Foreign Information and  
     Exchange Activities   
0 3 3 
Income Security for Veterans 2 1 3 
Other Transportation 1 2 3 
Consumer and Occupational  
     Health and Safety 
2 0 2 
Health Research and Training 1 1 2 
Agricultural Research and  
     Services 
0 2 2 
Military Research, Development,  
     Test, and Evaluation 
2 0 2 
Central Fiscal Operations 1 1 2 
Social Security 1 0 1 
Medical Care for Veterans  0 1 1 
Federal Litigative and Judicial  
    Activities 
1   0 1 
Military Operations and  0 1 1 
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     Maintenance 
Medicare 1 0 1 
Military Procurement  1 0 1 
Other Income Security 0 0 0 
Military Personnel  0 0 0 
Total 392 391 783 
 
 Table 2.1 provides reassurance on two counts: first, that there is considerable variance in 
the occurrence of punctuations across budget categories to explain, and second that complexity is 
a plausible avenue for exploring that variance. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 from Chapter 1 looked at 
annual changes to age demographics and hurricane damages, making clear that some inputs 
series are much less stable than others. It therefore is not no surprising in Table 2.1 to see that 
budget categories based on age demographics have the fewest punctuations, while spending on 
disaster relief and insurance has the most. I turn to a series of considerations of the conditions 
where we might see more and fewer punctuations, with the aim of developing a relatively fully 
specified model of instability in budgetary time series.  
Honeymoons, Learning, and Government Control  
 One obvious possibility for the presence of dramatic policy shifts is change at the top. 
New presidents, especially those with a different ideology from their predecessors, might want to 
make their stamp by dramatically adjusting spending patterns.  The chapter looks at this in two 
ways:  first, by considering whether new presidents, eager to live up to campaign promises, usher 
in large budgetary changes shortly after taking office. If presidents benefit from a honeymoon 
period, they may be uniquely able to make these larges changes during their first year or two in 
office (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Lockerbie, Borrelli and Hedger 1998; Pfiffner 1988; Beckmann 
and Godfrey 2007). Second, it considers the learning hypothesis, which suggests systematic 
changes in the likelihood of punctuations over the years of a president’s tenure in office. 
 32 
 
According to the learning hypothesis, presidents can be expected to achieve greater legislative 
success later in their terms, as they have more experience with the office and negotiating with 
Congress (Neustadt 2001; Light 1999). Table 2.2 looks at the honeymoon idea and Figure 2.2 
considers the learning hypothesis.  
Table 2.2. Punctuations in the First Budget Year of a Presidency 
Budget Year N 
% Pos. 
Punctuations 
T-test 
% Neg. 
Punctuations 
T-test 
First Budget Year 667 8.85 
1.25 
13.04 
-2.71* 
Subsequent Budget Years 3,184 10.46 9.55 
Total 3,851 10.18 - 10.15 - 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
 If new presidents were systematically making their mark in the first year when they had 
the opportunity to do so, there should be a high percentage of budget punctuations in that first 
year. Table 2.1 provides some support for this idea, showing that negative punctuations are 
slightly more common in a president’s first budget2. Positive punctuations, however, are slightly 
less likely, although not to a statistically significant degree. This suggests that new presidents are 
more inclined to make dramatic cuts to the budget during their first year in office than increases; 
perhaps in an effort to reverse policies associated with their predecessor. Will Jennings and Peter 
John (2010) explored a similar idea using the British speech from the throne, finding that 
speeches from new Prime Ministers immediately following their elections were somewhat more 
likely to show large differences from the previous year’s speech. The analysis offers modest 
support for their finding in the U.S. context.  
 What about subsequent years in office? Do presidents learn on the job? If presidents 
become more adept at working with Congress during their time in office, punctuations may be 
                                                 
2 President term years are lagged in this analysis so that budgets correspond with the presidents 
that authorized them. For example, a president elected in 2008 takes office in 2009 and submits 
his first budget to take effect in FY 2010.  The analysis count 2010 therefore as the “first year” 
for the purpose of these comparisons. 
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more likely toward the end of a presidential term. Another possibility would be that second-term 
presidents are less risk adverse and more willing to sign their names to major policy initiatives. 
Figure 2.2 shows the percent of budget changes falling in the positive and negative tails of the 
overall distribution, by presidential year. That is, for all presidents, the figure looks at the 
occurrence of punctuations as a percentage of total reallocations in their first, second, third year 
in office, and so on. 
Figure 2.2. Rate of Positive and Negative Punctuations by Year of Presidential Term 
 
By definition, 10 percent of all budget reallocations are negative and 10 percent positive 
punctuations. The figure shows that there is little fluctuation around this average, with all the 
values falling between seven and seventeen percent, but no strong trend in any direction. In 
particular, there is no evidence of steady growth over time, which would be consistent with the 
learning hypothesis. If anything, there is a slight inflection during the eighth year of a president’s 
term in the percentage of positive punctuations. This compliments Table 2.2, which showed that 
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positive punctuations are more likely after a president’s first budget. Overall though, there does 
not appear to be any major trend in punctuations associated with presidential term year. 
Another factor that might influence the occurrence of punctuations would be single party 
control of government. Majority parties under unified governments enjoy greater degrees of in-
party cooperation and institutional leverage, which afford them greater success in implementing 
their legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1991, Aldrich 1995, Coleman 1999). Further, 
periods of unified government may present majority parties with opportunities to pursue major 
policy initiatives; operating as a “release-valve” on pent-up issues that went unattended through 
political intractability. In turn, divided government imposes greater transaction costs on the 
president’s party, which can limit its productivity. Table 2.3 shows the occurrence of 
punctuations across three levels of party control – divided and unified government, and unified 
government with a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate (the highest level of party control 
possible).  
Table 2.3. Punctuations by Party Control 
Government N % Punctuations 
Divided 2,324 18.79 
Unified  1,527 21.85 
Unified & Filibuster Proof 591 21.63 
 
 The table shows a slight increase in the percentage of punctuations as party control 
solidifies. However, even during unified government with a filibuster-proof majority in the 
Senate, the budget is only 3 percent more likely to see an extreme change than during periods of 
divided government. In all, the evidence that either party control or presidential term year affect 
spending punctuations is somewhat limited. This suggests the ability of majority parties to 
implement sweeping reforms is highly constrained, regardless of governing conditions. In other 
words, punctuations seemingly have little to do with varying levels of party control. In contrast, 
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Table 2.1 showed that punctuations vary substantially across budget categories. It would seem 
that the roots of variance in the instability of policy outcomes lies primarily with factors intrinsic 
to different policy domains, rather than general conditions relating to governance. 
Direct Measure of Inputs  
Measuring all the inputs relevant to governing is impossible, but for some government 
programs inputs may be relatively straightforward to assess. Spending on unemployment benefits 
are clearly related to actual unemployment levels, for example. Likewise, Social Security 
payments are based on a formula that rests on changing age demographics, while spending on 
disaster relief and insurance is closely linked to the occurrence of weather related calamities. 
This section revisits Figures 1.4 and 1.5 from Chapter 1 - which looked at population 
demographics and hurricane damages – and considers data on unemployment insurance in order 
to give a brief history of the inputs relevant to these different government programs. The purpose 
is to illustrate how the natural complexity associated with different policy domains interacts with 
political complexity as a powerful driver of the instability observed in government budgets.  
 The Social Security Act of 1935 was a broad response to the Great Depression, designed 
to guarantee a minimum standard of living to the nation’s elderly by providing old-age benefits 
payable upon reaching the age of 65. However, in 1939 the law was expanded to provide benefits 
to the widows and children of workers who died prematurely, in 1956 the law came to include 
benefits to disabled workers over the age of 50, and in 1972 Social Security added the 
supplemental income program and underwent its first cost of living adjustment. So while the 
initial indicator relevant to Social Security payments was age demographics, this narrow scope 
was quickly expanded. Still, the centerpiece of the law remains payments to persons over the age 
of 65.  
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           Age demographics are comparatively simple, changing by only small annual margins. The 
left panel of Figure 2.3 shows the number of people in the US over the age of 65 from 1947 
through 2010, measured in millions of people. The slope of the increase is almost straight, 
indicating that the annual rate of change is fairly constant. If government spending on Social 
Security was tied directly to this population, as the original law provided, then government 
outlays to Social Security should match the rate of change observed in the population. This 
appears to be the case, as the right panel of Figure 2.3 makes clear. The figure shows outlays in 
billions of dollars by the Federal government toward Social Security and for the most part, 
government outlays match changes in the population; both steadily increase over time. The 
correlation between spending and population growth is 0.98.  
Note however, that changes in spending are not quite as smooth or gradual as the 
population trend. With Social Security, the government implemented a program with a clear 
indicator in mind – the elderly population – but policymakers quickly reconsidered the scope of 
their focus. By expanding the population targeted for Social Security payments and the size of 
the payments themselves, the government was soon diverted from stable demographics to 
considering a more diverse array of indicators. Of course, if we knew the appropriate indicator to 
relate to each government program, then we would have solved the complexity problem that 
causes governments to over- and under-respond to issues in the first place. Uncertainly about the 
appropriate indicator for any government program, can crate instability even in seemingly 
straightforward programs like Social Security. Overall, however, spending on Social Security 
shows little evidence of large-scale disequilibria.  
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Figure 2.3. Comparing Age Demographics and Federal Outlays on Social Security  
a) US Population Aged 65 and Over      b) Social Security Outlays 
  
Note: Correlation between spending and population = 0.98 
 Unemployment insurance is another government program where the relevant indicator 
would seem relatively straightforward to assess. Like Social Security, the unemployment 
insurance system was enacted in response to the Great Depression. In fact, it was the same Social 
Security Act signed by President Roosevelt in 1935 that contained provisions directing the states 
to develop unemployment laws in partnership with the federal government. Unlike Social 
Security, however, unemployment insurance is not based on stable age demographics. Rather, 
the number of unemployed follows the economic business cycle, which has less predictable 
dynamics.  
 Figure 2.4 compares the number of unemployed (in the left-panel) to federal outlays on 
unemployment (on the right). As with Figure 2.3, the correlation between the two panels is high: 
0.83. But in this case, government outlays show much greater instability, as would be expected 
for a program that is based on an indicator that is itself highly volatile. Unemployment insurance 
is also more contentious than Social Security; debates about eligibility and the duration and size 
of benefits have surrounded the program since its inception. Political disagreements have led to 
frequent upheaval in the laws governing unemployment benefits, which may contribute to the 
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volatility on display in the right-panel. Further, we can expect policymakers to under or over-
react to unemployment levels, so spending adjustments are not necessarily proportional to 
changes in the unemployment rate. Still, the high correlation indicates that spending tracks 
unemployment quite closely, so we can surmise that variability in economic fundamentals is a 
powerful source of the instability in spending.  
Figure 2.4. Comparing Unemployment and Federal Outlays on Unemployment Compensation 
a) The Number of Unemployed    b) Unemployment Outlays  
  
Note: Correlation between spending and unemployment = 0.83 
 Finally, I look at spending on disaster relief and insurance – an area of budgeting where 
the relevant indicators are extremely difficult to predict. Until the early 1900s, the federal 
government responded to natural disasters by passing case-specific legislation. In the 1930s 
various agencies were tasked with responding to different categories of disaster, but it was not 
until 1979 that these efforts were consolidated into the modern Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). Outlays to this program are highly contingent on the occurrence of natural 
disasters, such as hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, or droughts. Unlike age demographics or 
even unemployment rates, however, the frequency and intensity of natural disasters defy easy 
prediction. The left panel of Figure 2.5 illustrates this by showing normalized hurricane damages 
in the US from 1900 through 2005. While age demographics showed a clear, steadily increasing 
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trend and unemployment levels appeared cyclical, there is no apparent trend with hurricane 
damages. Instead, the size of the damage fluctuates widely from year to year.  
 Based on the left-panel of Figure 2.5, we can expect any program where spending is tied 
to the scale of natural disasters to undergo frequent punctuations. The right-panel of Figure 2.4, 
which shows annual inflation-adjusted outlays for disaster relief and insurance, confirms this 
expectation. Spending on disaster relief is highly erratic and, further, does not come close to 
matching the pattern of hurricane damages. In part, this discrepancy can be attributed to the fact 
that disaster relief includes many categories of natural disaster besides just hurricanes, but we 
can also expect the government to respond inefficiently to certain natural disasters; overspending 
in some cases and underspending in others. The larger point is that budget categories that are 
linked to stochastic input series show high levels of volatility, while those linked to more stable 
inputs show much less. 
Figure 2.5. Comparing Hurricane Damages and Federal Outlays to Disaster Relief  
a) Hurricane Damages     b) Outlays to Disaster Relief and Insurance 
 
Note: Correlation between spending and hurricane damages = 0.30 
 
 Table 2.1 shows that spending on disaster relief and insurance underwent 43 punctuations 
from 1947 to 2012. During the same period, spending on unemployment compensation saw 21 
punctuations and Social Security had only 1. Figures 2.3 through 2.5 go a long way toward 
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explaining the disparity. Age demographics change incrementally and predictably from year to 
year, unemployment levels follow the economic business cycle, but hurricane damages fluctuate 
wildly. By linking spending programs to these very different sets of indicators, policymakers 
ensure that the budget will undergo both incremental and extreme changes. However, the 
stability of indicators is not the whole story. Often there is uncertainty as to what indicators are 
the most appropriate measures to inform public policy and this was reflected in that fact that 
outlays for Social Security and unemployment insurance did not perfectly match either age 
demographics or unemployment levels.  
Predicting Punctuations 
The preceding analysis offers clues as to what factors are related to policy instability. Can 
we put it all together and predict the occurrence of a punctuation in budgetary time series? 
Successfully predicting punctuations has largely eluded the agenda-setting literature, for the most 
part because the occurrence of punctuations is thought to be predominantly stochastic, making 
the specification of statistical models challenging. Undaunted, the chapter estimates a series of 
logistic regressions.           
 A key independent variable is the complexity associated with each budget category and 
the expectation is that instabilities will increase with complexity. To operationalize complexity, I 
use a dataset available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which links spending 
allocations to the government agencies in charge of implementing them. For example, the 
National Science Foundation is frequently authorized to spend money allocated to the budget 
category for “general science and basic research.” The BEA data is available from 1976 through 
2008 and during this period some categories, such as Social Security, have fallen exclusively 
under the purview of a single agency, while others are carried out by upward of 20. The measure 
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of complexity simply counts the number of unique agencies that have been linked to each 
subfunction. Figure 2.6 shows the cumulative frequencies of agencies to subfunctions. All 60 
subfunctions that appear in the BEA data are associated with at least one agency; about 15 are 
linked to more than 10 agencies, and only 2 are associated with more than 20. The measure is a 
simple but effective operationalization because complexity should be especially acute where 
multiple agencies are involved as there will be more room for disagreement over the varying 
“solutions” that different agencies have to offer.  
Figure 2.6. The Number of Agencies by Subfunction  
         
 Beyond complexity, the regressions include dichotomous variables for a honeymoon 
period and unified government, coded 1 if the reallocations were from the first budget of a new 
president or took place during unified government. The regressions also account for 
congressional polarization, which might similarly affect the possibility for major policy shifts. 
When polarization is low, there is more room for cooperation between parties, but during periods 
of high polarization, even basic responsibilities such as funding the government can be 
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sidetracked. To operationalize polarization the regressions includes a measure of House 
polarization adopted from Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores. From 
1947 through 2012 the measure varies between 0.40 and 1.10, with lower values indicating less 
polarization. Finally, the regressions control for the amount of money allocated to each 
subfunction in each year. A plausible concern would be that punctuations are more likely for 
small budget categories, as it is comparatively easy to make a large change to a small base value. 
Table 2.4 shows the results of the first model, predicting the occurrence of a punctuation in either 
the positive or negative direction.3    
Table 2.4. Logistic Regression Predicting the Occurrence of Budget Punctuations  
Variable Odds Ratio Standard Error 
Lagged Punctuation 6.02* 0.57 
Dollars 0.99* 0.00 
Unified Government 1.08* 0.10 
House Polarization  0.54* 0.13 
Honeymoon Period 1.12* 0.13 
Subfunction Complexity  1.03* 0.00 
N = 3,405 
Pseudo R2 = 0.126 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
 
 The odds-ratios for all 6 variables are in the expected direction and 4 are statistically 
significant. Clearly dramatic changes cluster together in budgetary time series; a punctuation is 
600% more likely if one occurred the previous year. Punctuations are less likely as budget 
categories increase in size, but as the dollar variable is coded in thousands, the effect is only very 
modest. As expected polarization is a strong predictor of policy instability. Moving from very 
low to very high polarization decreases the likelihood of a major policy shift by about 50%. We 
also see a strong, and highly significant, effect for subfunction complexity. Each additional 
                                                 
3 The appendix to the chapter estimates a cross-sectional time-series model with random effects, 
treating each budget category as the panel unit. In this specification, the dependent variable is the 
absolute value of percent change in spending. Results are robust across model specifications.   
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agency increases the chance for a punctuation by 3% and this variable ranges from 1 to 27, so 
moving from the least to the most complex budget category has a major effect. The odds-ratio 
for unified government and the first budget of a new president are above 1, as expect, but not 
significant. These effects may simply be drowned out when controlling for other factors. We can 
imagine, for instance, that the ability of presidents to inflect a budget with their own priorities 
will be highly contingent on polarization, regardless of any benefits incurred through a 
honeymoon period.  
         Table 2.4 provides an overview that supports the chapter’s theoretical underpinnings; chief 
among them that complexity powerfully conditions the stability of policy outcomes. But there is 
no reason to expect that policymaking works the same way in both directions - the dynamics of 
large increases in spending may be very different from those that determine when a major 
spending cut will take place. To address this possibility I estimate a multinomial logit model, 
with categories for positive and negative punctuation. Table 2.5 shows the results.  
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Table 2.5. Logistic Regression Predicting the Occurrence of Positive and Negative Punctuations 
Variable Odds Ratio Standard Error 
Positive Punctuation   
Lagged Punctuation 0.91* 0.07 
Dollars -0.00* 0.00 
Unified Government -0.01* 0.12 
House Polarization  -1.07* 0.32 
Honeymoon Period -0.09* 0.16 
Subfunction Complexity  0.03* 0.00 
Constant -2.00* 0.23 
Negative Punctuation   
Lagged Punctuation 0.91* 0.07 
Dollars -0.00* 0.00 
Unified Government 0.29* 0.12 
House Polarization  -0.42* 0.30 
Honeymoon Period 0.31* 0.14 
Subfunction Complexity  0.03* 0.00 
Constant -2.51* 0.23 
N = 3,417 
Pseudo R2 = 0.077 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
 
 Based on the large and statistically significant odds-ratio for lagged punctuations we can 
conclude that dramatic increases (or decreases) in spending often play out over multiple years. 
Note that the effect of congressional polarization and subfunction complexity are similar to what 
was seen with the full model in Table 2.4. The odds-ratio for dollars is no longer significant, 
suggesting that the size of budget categories does not alter their likelihood of seeing major 
increases in spending.  
          The model is equally successful at predicting negative punctuations. But, for the first time, 
polarization does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a punctuation 
occurring. It seems that punctuations of any type are less likely when polarization is high, which 
is consistent with the idea that political gridlock is a corollary of polarization. Another change 
from the previous regressions is that the presidential honeymoon period now positively predicts 
the occurrence of large spending cuts. This suggests that presidents are more inclined during 
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their first year in office to reverse the policies of their predecessors than to embark on their own 
initiatives. Subfunction complexity is again a strong predictor of major spending changes. This 
matches theoretical expectations; agencies assigned to the same budget function experience 
fiscal windfalls and hardships together.    
Discussion 
 Previous research focuses generally on cognitive and institutional limitations as the 
primary cause of punctuations in outputs from various organizational decision-making processes. 
The goal in this chapter has been to unpack the black box these limitations have come to 
represent and encourage a discussion of the factors that may explain variation in the degree of 
punctuations seen in various political outcomes. The advantage of this approach is that it directly 
measures relevant inputs, considering how variance in the stability of different input series can 
help explain the occurrence of punctuations. Budget categories which are tied to unstable inputs 
are much more likely to experience spending punctuations than are those categories linked to 
more stable input series. The other powerful predictor of punctuations was political complexity, 
which was operationalized in the model using the subfunction-complexity score. But governing 
conditions, including presidential term year and majority party control of government, apparently 
have little effect on the occurrence of punctuations. The exception to this was polarization, which 
greatly reduced the likelihood of punctuations in any direction.  
Given these findings, we can reasonably expect that even a government operating without 
cognitive or institutional frictions would occasionally produce spending punctuations, so long as 
it was responsive to changing stochastic events. By tying large portions of the budgets to 
demographic changes, policymakers ensure that many spending reallocations will be automatic 
and incremental. So, in summary, while it is logical to assume that aggregate inputs will be 
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normally distributed, and while a perfectly attentive government may produce normally 
distributed outlays to match, actual governments are highly sensitive to specific inputs that are 
on a case-by-case basis unstable. This seems especially relevant considering that the link 
between efficiency and punctuated change distributions is usually drawn such that greater 
instability is indicative of less efficiency. It is true that if governments had access to perfect 
models of the natural world, explanations for spending instabilities would rest heavily on shifting 
political considerations. An altogether different question is how efficient are governments at 
processing the information they have available. From this perspective, reactive punctuations take 
on a new significance. The U.S. government does not know when a powerful hurricane will hit 
the Gulf Coast, but at least it can respond to the disaster when it happens. Given current levels of 
information, a change distribution without any punctuations is more sinister than one with high 
kurtosis.  
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CHAPTER THREE: HOW ROBUST ARE DISTRIBUTIONAL FINDINGS OF 
PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM IN PUBLIC BUDGETS?  
 A curious finding from Chapter 2 was that many spending punctuations appear to be 
immediately followed by a dramatic change in the opposite direction. Negative punctuations 
were 900% more likely after a positive punctuation and positive punctuations 400% more likely 
after major spending cuts. This suggests that punctuations are often fleeting, with policymakers 
moving to reverse major shifts in spending after only one year. This temporary dynamic is hard 
to reconcile with punctuation equilibrium theory, which emphasizes competition between policy 
solutions as a key driver of political instability. The logic of this idea is that the negative 
feedback forces that generate the equilibrium can occasionally be disrupted, creating a surge of 
self-reinforcing changes that rapidly achieve a new equilibrium. But if punctuations see major 
reversals after only one year, then it would be difficult to claim that some new equilibrium has 
been reached. That is, far from paradigm-shifts punctuations may indicate brief governmental 
interventions to address temporary and stochastic problems.  
   At issue, is the distributional approach to policy studies, which pools observations 
across multiple years and issue domains. (I took this approach in Chapter 2 and the section on 
empirical methods from Chapter 1 describes the methodology.) Given the findings from Chapter 
2, a concern is that different processes could be generating the cases in the central peak of the 
distribution and those far out in the tails. The normal interpretation has been that a single theory 
can account both the periods of stability and massive change. The cases in the tails represent 
punctuations – dramatic shifts in policy direction, or at least massive changes in budgetary 
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commitments to certain ideas – and the high central peak is caused by inattention to the majority 
of problems.  
 Concerns about what causes punctuations can be largely avoided using a historical, case-
study approach, and indeed, this is the methodology that was employed by Baumgartner and 
Jones when developing their theory (1993). It continues to be an important tool in policy studies, 
but the distributional approach has gained widespread popularity because it offers both a 
comprehensive perspective and facilitates international comparisons. There is in this case a 
tradeoff between generalizability and precision. In this chapter I ask if the tails and central peaks 
of budget distributions could be generated by factors inconsistent with the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium. I begin by exploring how often and how quickly punctuations see reversals and then 
assess the robustness of fat-tailed distributions controlling for relevant factors. 
Background 
My approach is informed by previous research that explores the nature of policy 
punctuations. In particular, I look to a study by Peter John and Shuan Bevan (2011) that develops 
a three-tiered typology for punctuations in the U.K. context as an intellectual precursor to the 
current analysis. They group punctuations according to three causal processes: procedural 
adjustments, low-salience, and high-salience adjustments. Their argument is that punctuations 
resulting from procedural reclassifications are a-theoretical and in some cases should be removed 
from the data. Further, they point out that it is difficult to reconcile punctuations occurring in the 
absence of any attention to the casual process identified by punctuation equilibrium theory. Their 
question then is how many of the punctuations they observe can be linked to shifts in attention, 
rather than the competing mechanisms. They discover that a substantial proportion—about 
half—of the punctuations they identify occurred either as part of a procedural adjustment or with 
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an almost complete lack of public attention. I engage in a similar process here, identifying 
mechanisms in the data generating process that could potentially produce cases in the tails of a 
distributional analysis which would not correspond to the data generating process implied in the 
punctuated equilibrium model. 
Identifying Punctuations  
 I start by returning to a classic example of a punctuation—coverage of pesticides, as 
originally documented by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). They describe how from their 
development around the turn of the 20th century until the late 1950s pesticides were viewed as a 
marvel of modern technology, a panacea that would usher in a new age of agricultural 
productivity and public health. Given the positive press surrounding pesticides it seemed logical 
for the U.S. government to support their liberal application, and indeed large swaths of the 
continental U.S. and other parts of the world were blanketed in DDT. Then, in the mid-1950s, it 
began to dawn on people that while very effective at killing insects, pesticides do not 
discriminate; they kill many other things as well. This idea culminated with the publication of 
Silent Spring in 1962 by Rachel Carson, which documented the disastrous environmental 
consequences of indiscriminate pesticide use.  
Figure 3.1, which is borrowed from Baumgartner and Jones (1993), clearly shows the 
dramatic reversal of fortunes pesticides saw in the 1950s. The turning point appears to be 1957. 
Before this year, articles on pesticides had been remarkably supportive—in many years every 
single article on the topic had a positive tone. After 1957, the majority of articles cast a negative 
light on pesticides. I have updated the original figure after conducting difference of means tests 
using 1957 as the dividing point in the data. The dashed horizontal lines show the mean value of 
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support before and after 1957. As the subtext to the figure notes, before 1957 this value was 93% 
and after it was 29%, representing a major shift in the debate over pesticides. 
Figure 3.1. The Classic Punctuation: Media Coverage of Pesticides  
 
The dynamic on display in Figure 3.1 exemplifies what is typically thought of as a 
punctuation in the literature on agenda setting. This is the idea that disequilibria in policy series 
herald a paradigm shift, where some new approach or solution takes precedent and traditional 
ways of doing things are rapidly discarded. In the case of pesticides, this shift came when people 
stopped viewing pesticides as an easy solution to various societal problems and started seeing 
them as harmful carcinogens. With this type of punctuation we should be able to look at a policy 
series and draw a clear line denoting the point where perceptions flipped and a new paradigm 
took hold.  
But moving to a distributional approach allows the possibility that many of the 
punctuations we observe are ‘false’ or temporary, in the sense that they are quickly reversed and 
signify very little about political agendas. How then do we distinguish between ‘real’ 
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punctuations, the focus of agenda-setting theories, and temporary punctuations? This is the 
central question of the chapter, and I employ various empirical strategies to answer it. 
One straightforward approach is to test for serial auto-correlation, with the expectation 
that volatile policy series where punctuations are quickly reversed will show low correlations 
between current and previous values.  In Figure 3.1, it is clear that during the early period, values 
remain consistently high; only in 1957 does the value dramatically shift from the previous value, 
and remain distinct in its future values from the past ones.  Seen in this way, inertia is a key 
element of the theory. Most issues, most of the time, maintain a certain ‘stickiness,’ maintained 
in equilibrium by negative feedback. Serial auto-correlation is a simple way to look at this; series 
with high inertia should have high correlations between any given value and the previous one.  
Series with high variability around a central value that itself does not change, do not correspond 
with the theory, and they would show low values of serial auto-correlation.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates the expected relationship by plotting the percent positive media 
coverage about pesticides against their lagged values (the data are the same as from Figure 3.1). 
Here auto-correlation is very high and we see that the data is divided into two groups; high 
values (stemming from the period before the punctuation in 1957) and consistently low values 
(coming after the 1957 collapse in the public image of the industry). So, with the one major 
exception, last year’s values are a strong predictor of current year values. As series become more 
volatile, and punctuations more temporary, we can expect this relationship to break down.  
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Figure 3.2. Serial Auto-correlation in Coverage of Pesticides, 1900 to 1988. 
 
I turn now to spending by the U.S. federal government from 1947 to 2012 in order to 
systematically document the occurrence of temporary versus sustained punctuations, but I begin 
with simple descriptive examples. Remember that the pesticides example represents the classic 
but also ideal case of a sustained punctuation, so one question is how closely any budgetary 
series will come to replicating that pattern of change.  
Figure 3.3 shows outlays toward “space flight, research, and supporting activities”, one of 
the 66 non-financial budget categories (called subfunctions in OMB parlance) that make up the 
U.S. budget. The left-panel, tracking outlays in millions of dollars, reveals some dramatic 
changes in spending. Most notable is the enormous increase that took place in the early-1960s 
corresponding to the Apollo moon missions. But these high levels of spending were not 
sustained and after successfully landing a person on the moon the government substantially 
scaled back spending to this category. Still, spending never returns to its pre-Apollo levels and 
space flight is certainly a higher priority in the modern era than it was before 1958. So while the 
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major punctuation in this series is not sustained to the same degree as what we saw when looking 
at pesticides, this is a clear example of ‘real’, substantively interesting punctuation. The right 
panel of Figure 3.3 looks at the serial auto-correlation of spending on space flight, revealing a 
pattern that is familiar from the pesticides example. Current spending levels are correlated with 
the previous year’s spending at 0.95 and again we see gaps in the coverage corresponding to the 
occurrence of a punctuation.  
Figure 3.3. U.S. Spending on Space Flight, Research, and Supporting Activities, 1948 to 2012 
a) Outlays       b) Serial Auto-correlation 
  
 
 
For an example of a temporary or ‘false’ punctuation consider Figure 3.4, which tracks 
outlays toward “disaster relief and insurance”. Again the left-panel of the figure shows annual 
outlays, where, unlike with spending on space flight, it is difficult to see trends indicative of a 
larger political agenda beyond the basic need for responsible governments to respond to crises as 
they occur. The right-panel of Figure 3.4 supports the assertion that measuring serial auto-
correlation can be a useful tool to distinguish between series that are prone to temporary versus 
sustained punctuations. Here we see that current values are only correlated at 0.20 with the 
previous year’s spending; exactly what we would expect from a series that is heavily driven by 
exogenous shocks.  
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Figure 3.4.  U.S. Outlays toward Disaster Relief and Insurance, 1951 to 2012 
a) Outlays      b) Serial Auto-correlation 
  
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 both look at discretionary spending topics, but the U.S. budget is 
increasingly devoted to spending on mandatory programs, where spending levels are determined 
by well-established formulas that are politically difficult to adjust. A substantial part of the 
budget is therefore largely insulated from the type of agenda setting thought to cause policy 
punctuations. Further, spending for many of the mandatory categories is often strongly driven by 
demographic trends, such as retirements, and should logically have dynamics distinct from those 
domains that are subject to endogenous or exogenous shocks. We cannot state that any particular 
budget category is driven by a purely demographic logic; even in the case of retirements and 
pensions, important shifts sometimes occur in the formulae used to determine entitlements. But 
some budget categories are clearly much more prone to instabilities than others.  
Figure 3.5 considers Social Security, revealing the particular dynamics that appear to 
govern mandatory spending relating to demographic shifts. While spending on space flight was 
subject to the whims of political enthusiasm, and in the case of disaster relief the extreme 
variability of the physical climate, spending on Social Security climbs relentlessly upward 
regardless of party control of government or historical circumstances. Note that the correlation in 
the right-panel is at 0.99, emphasizing that there are almost never large shifts in spending.  
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Figure 3.5. U.S. Budget Authority toward Social Security, 1947 to 2012 
a) Budget Authority     b) Serial auto-correlation  
  
The type of change exemplified by spending on space flight, where shifting political 
ideals determined spending levels, is the best match to the causal process commonly identified in 
the literature on punctuations. But as this brief review demonstrates, it is far from the only 
dynamic at work. A fuller understanding of the causes of policy change must take seriously the 
possibility that policymakers have tied their hands by placing a majority of the budget under 
automatic spending formulas. While this does not eliminate political agendas as a causal factor—
formulas are sometimes updated—it does suggest that much of the budget will not be particularly 
susceptible to agenda setting dynamics as laid out in the theoretical literature. A larger concern 
would be that much of the instability usually attributed to the rise and fall of issue frames is 
actually rooted in a much simpler and politically mundane phenomenon—the need for 
governments to respond to various military and natural crises. When a crisis occurs spending is 
dramatically ramped up in response, but as soon as the emergency dissipates, spending is brought 
back down to pre-crisis levels. In these circumstances, punctuations in the positive direction 
would beget major decreases in spending within a few years; we would observe instabilities 
coming and going. This tidal process could be a powerful source of the instability observed in 
government budgets, but would have little connection to traditional conceptions of agenda 
setting.   
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Given the various concerns and competing causal processes my goals are twofold. First, I 
make a systematic effort to document the relative frequencies with which temporary and 
sustained punctuations occur in budgetary time series. Then, informed by that effort, I test the 
robustness of previous findings after excluding categories prone to temporary punctuations and 
mandatory spending.  
Measuring Sustained Punctuations in the U.S. Budget 
 The focus is on U.S. budget authority from 1947 to 2012 and Figure 3.6 reintroduces the 
budget distribution from Chapter 2. Once again, a punctuation is defined at the top and bottom 
ten percent of the observed changes, for a total of 783 punctuations.  
Figure 3.6. Identifying Punctuations in the Distribution of Annual Changes in Federal Budget 
Authority, 1947 to 2012 
 
Many studies have sought to explain the causes of punctuations, but for the most part 
these investigations have rested on broad theoretical arguments about the disproportionately of 
government information processing. Few attempts have been made to ‘drill down’ into the data 
in order to determine how many of the punctuations we observe can be attributed to shifting 
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political agendas versus high volatility in input series that force a government response. Both 
factors are clearly at work, as the examples looking at outlays toward space flight and disaster 
relief demonstrated. So the question is simply: how many of the punctuations defined Figure 3.6 
are temporary versus sustained?  
Of course, ‘temporary’ and ‘sustained’ are subjective terms, so there are many ways to go 
about answering the question. Table 3.1 provides 20 possible answers. It documents the number 
of punctuations that are reversed by a certain percent over a certain number of years. Reading the 
first row of the table from left to right reveals that 376 punctuations, or 49% percent of the total, 
were reversed by at least 10% after only 1 year, 394 were reversed by at least 10% after 2 years, 
and so on. What does it mean to say that a punctuation was reversed by at least 10%?  Consider a 
punctuation that increased spending to a budget category by 75% over its base value of $100 (so 
for the year the punctuation took place spending is now at $175). If in the year following that 
punctuation spending then decreased by at least $7.5 (10% of the $75 increase), we can say that 
punctuation was reversed by 10% in 1 year.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 I calculate reversals separately for positive and negative punctuations. In the case of a negative 
punctuation, a 75% decrease to a base value of $100 leaves $25. I consider that punctuation 
reversed by 10% within 1 year, if in the next year spending was increased by at least $7.5.  
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Table 3.1. How many Punctuations see Reversals between 10 and 90% within 4 years? 
Note: Year 1 Punctuations = 766; Year 2 = 754; Year 3 = 740; Year 4 = 726 
 
Table 3.1 shows the number of punctuations that saw reversals according to different 
terms, leaving the remaining punctuations to qualify as sustained5. That is, if 49% of 
punctuations were reversed, then the remaining 51% can be thought of as sustained. In this way, 
the table presents definition of varying strictness for what constitutes a sustained punctuation. 
The upper-right cells in the table show definitions that are very strict; here any punctuation that 
is reversed by 10% over the course of 3 or 4 years is considered temporary. Using this definition 
would place the majority of the punctuations documented in Figure 3.6 in the temporary 
category. The lower-left cell shows the least restrictive definition, where only punctuations that 
are reversed by more than 90% within 1 year qualify as temporary. Depending on which cell in 
the table we occupy makes a big difference as to our conclusions regarding the relative 
frequencies of these punctuations. Regardless of definition, temporary punctuations make up a 
substantial proportion of the instabilities documented in Figure 3.6; somewhere between 17% 
and 54%.  
Figure 3.7 provides a hypothetical example of a punctuation that has decayed by 10% 
within 4 years (the definition from the upper-right cell in the table). The idea here is to give a 
visual sense for this type of change. The figure shows two huge increases in spending, which 
within 4 years have been reversed by exactly 10%, with the vertical lines showing the 4-year 
                                                 
5 Note that the total number of punctuations diminishes slightly when calculating changes 
multiple years in the future because observations are lost from years 2009 through 2012.   
Reversal  1 Year 2 Year 3 Years 4 Years 
10% + 376 (49%) 394 (52%) 400 (54%) 383 (52%) 
25% + 309 (40%) 332 (44%) 342 (46%) 342 (47%) 
50% + 217 (28%) 255 (34%) 278 (38%) 279 (38%) 
75% + 160 (21%) 199 (26%) 224 (30%) 230 (32%) 
90% + 128 (17%) 164 (22%) 189 (26%) 201 (28%) 
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window. If we accept the upper-right cell as our definition of a sustained punctuation, then the 
changes Figure 3.7 displays would not qualify. This clarifies just how restrictive this definition 
is, and it should come as no surprise that under this definition fewer than half the total 
punctuations are considered sustained.  
Figure 3.7. Hypothetical Budget Series with Punctuations that are Reversed by 10% in 4 years 
 
Figure 3.8 provides a similar hypothetical this time for the cell in the lower-left of the 
table—punctuations that are reversed by 90% within 1 year. Clearly this is an altogether more 
dramatic reversal, where within 1 year the original punctuation is almost completely eliminated.  
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Figure 3.8. Hypothetical Budget Series with Punctuations that are Reversed by 90% in 1 year 
 
I have tried to show that the number of punctuations that can be considered sustained 
depends heavily on the parameters involved, but in order to proceed to subsequent analysis I 
must pick a definition. I define sustained punctuations as those that do not see reversals upward 
of 50% within 4 years (the middle cell in the right-most column of Table 1). The logic behind 
this choice is that the process by which new issue frames supplement old ones is thought to play 
out over many years or decades, so we can reasonably expect punctuations that are brought about 
by shifting political agendas to last at least 4 years. I pick the 50% reversal rate simply as a 
conservative, middle-of-the-road option. Based on this definition, 279 punctuations are classified 
as temporary and 447 as sustained. Table 3.2 shows how these punctuations are distributed by 
OMB subfunction, and the right-most column shows the serial auto-correlation of each budget 
series.  
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Table 3.2. Total Punctuations and Punctuations Sustained by at least 50% over 4 Years, by OMB 
Subfunction 
OMB Subfunction  Total Sustained Temporary Auto-Corr. 
Disaster Relief and Insurance  37 20 17 0.21 
Military—Other  28 14 14 0.23 
Farm Income Stabilization 31 18 13 0.60 
Area and Regional Development 23 12 11 0.52 
Community Development 21 10 11 0.99 
General Property and Records  
     Management 
28 17 11 0.48 
Other Advancement of Commerce 28 17 11 0.43 
Higher Education 22 12 10 0.81 
Unemployment Compensation 20 10 10 0.85 
Defense-related Activities 23 14 9 0.45 
International Development and  
     Humanitarian Assistance 
23 14 9 0.74 
International Security Assistance 27 18 9 0.79 
Housing Assistance 21 13 8 0.65 
Training and Employment 20 12 8 0.69 
Veterans Education, Training, and  
     Rehabilitation 
27 19 8 0.92 
Other Income Security 7 0 7 0.99 
Research and General Education Aids 15 8 7 0.93 
Executive Direction and Management 12 6 6 0.93 
Military Construction  11 5 6 0.75 
Other General Government 23 17 6 0.65 
Conservation and Land Management 12 7 5 0.91 
Criminal Justice Assistance 14 9 5 0.77 
Water Resources 11 6 5 0.55 
Central Personnel Management 10 6 4 0.62 
Elementary, Secondary, and  
     Vocational Education 
10 6 4 0.74 
Energy Conservation 6 2 4 0.00 
General Purpose Fiscal Assistance 14 10 4 0.83 
General Retirement and Disability 10 6 4 0.70 
Ground Transportation 12 8 4 0.81 
Pollution Control and Abatement 10 6 4 0.41 
Recreational Resources 10 6 4 0.93 
Conduct of Foreign Affairs 9 6 3 0.98 
Health Care Services 8 5 3 0.99 
Legislative Functions 5 2 3 0.99 
Other Labor Services 7 4 3 0.71 
Space Flight, Research, and  
     Supporting Activities 
13 10 3 0.95 
Water Transportation 6 3 3 0.93 
Atomic Energy Defense Activities 9 7 2 0.68 
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Emergency Energy Preparedness 11 9 2 0.73 
Energy Information, Policy, and  
     Regulation 
9 7 2 0.84 
Federal Correctional Activities  4 2 2 0.99 
General Science and Basic Research 8 6 2 0.97 
Income Security for Veterans 3 1 2 0.77 
Military (1947-1956) 3 1 2 0.68 
Social Services 7 5 2 0.96 
Air Transportation 9 8 1 0.97 
Central Fiscal Operations 2 1 1 0.97 
Consumer and Occupational Health  
     and Safety 
3 2 1 0.99 
Federal Employee Retirement and  
     Disability 
5 4 1 0.98 
Federal Law Enforcement Activities 6 5 1 0.99 
Food and Nutrition Assistance 8 7 1 0.99 
Military Procurement  1 0 1 0.87 
Other Natural Resources 4 3 1 0.99 
Other Veterans Benefits and Services 5 4 1 0.95 
Agricultural Research and Services 1 1 0 0.97 
Federal Litigative and Judicial  
     Activities 
1 1 0 0.99 
Foreign Information and Exchange  
     Activities   
3 3 0 0.88 
Health Research and Training 0 0 0 0.97 
Medical Care for Veterans  2 2 0 0.99 
Medicare 1 1 0 0.99 
Military Family Housing  2 2 0 0.80 
Military Operations and Maintenance 1 1 0 0.97 
Military Personnel  0 0 0 0.92 
Military Research, Development, Test,  
     and Evaluation 
2 2 0 0.98 
Other Transportation 3 3 0 0.79 
Social Security 1 1 0 0.99 
Total 726 447 279 0.99 
Note: Temporary punctuations are correlated with auto-correlation at –0.60.  
 
Table 3.2 is sorted by temporary punctuations, making clear that topics driven by 
exogenous shocks tend to have the most (disaster relief, farm support), while those topics 
associated with mandatory programs have fewer (Social Security, Medicare). The column 
displaying serial auto-correlation shows the continuation of the pattern established with spending 
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on space flight and disaster relief—frequent temporary punctuations are associated with lower 
auto-correlation.  
Are Previous Findings Robust? 
 If much of the instability we observe in budgetary time series can be attributed to 
policymakers ratcheting up spending to address an unforeseen crisis and then quickly bring it 
back down to equilibrium or pre-crises levels, this points to a different causal process than is 
commonly identified in the literature on punctuations. Further, the increasing proportion of the 
budget that goes to mandatory spending topics suggests that there will be a strong tendency 
toward incremental adjustments. This raises the possibility that the well-known kurtosis in 
government outlays is less a function of agenda setting and more attributable to stochastic inputs 
series and mandatory spending formulas. That is, we observe high leptokurtosis because we 
combine budget categories that are prone to shocks and incrementalism. Critically, however, the 
type of change engendered by these categories is not well-explained by traditional ideas about 
agenda setting and the rise and fall of competing frames. A concern is that by removing these 
categories from the analysis, isolating the areas of the budget where we do expect agenda setting 
dynamics to be at work, we can produce a distribution that is much less punctuated, with lower 
kurtosis.  
To investigate this possibility, I reproduce the budget distribution from Figure 3.6 after 
excluding various budget categories from the analysis. Table 3.3 displays the kurtosis statistics 
associated with each modified distribution.6 The first and second row drop the top 3 and top 9 
categories for temporary punctuations as identified in Table 3.2. Here, there are only very 
                                                 
6 Note: I do not eliminate the punctuations, but the entire series associated with the excess 
temporary punctuations.  That is because I am interested in the full distribution of changes, and 
eliminating the cases in the tails but leaving all other cases would mathematically generate 
reduced kurtosis, obviously. 
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marginal differences. The l-kurtosis for the full distribution is 0.62, in the first row it is 0.58, and 
after dropping the top 9 categories it falls to 0.56. This suggests a decreasing trend to be sure, but 
in each case the distribution is remains distinctly leptokurtic even after removing the series that 
could be thought to generate potentially artifactual punctuations. The third row of the table drops 
mandatory categories, which causes an increase in the kurtosis statistics, and finally the fourth 
and fifth rows look at the combined effects. In all, there is very little movement in the l-kurtosis 
statistics across any of the categories. This suggests that the concern is unfounded; a key finding 
in literature on punctuations—the high kurtosis of budget distributions—is highly robust. Even 
after eliminating categories prone to incrementalism and stochastic shocks in order to focus more 
directly on areas of the budget where agenda setting dynamics are most applicable, we find the 
same pattern of change.  
Table 3.3. Kurtosis of U.S. Budget Distribution with Stochastic and Mandatory Series Excluded, 
1947 to 2012 
Excluding:  N Kurtosis L-kurtosis 
Top 3 Categories for Temporary Punctuations  3,712 431.54 0.589 
Top 9 Categories for Temporary Punctuations 3,341 394.00 0.560 
Mandatory Spending Categories 3,118 416.93 0.632 
Mandatory and Top 3 3,017 400.03 0.598 
Mandatory and Top 9 2,776 377.86 0.562 
Full Distribution 3,831 467.76 0.621 
Note: Excludes lagged values less than $50 million  
 
The finding of high kurtosis in budget series appears ubiquitous, but is it becoming less 
so over time? Jones, Baumgartner, and True (1998) have demonstrated a general secular decline 
in the volatility of budgets over the decades from 1948 to the recent period. This trend can be 
attributed to the increasingly large proportion of outlays that are determined by mandatory 
formulas. As more of the budget becomes insulated from the agenda dynamics thought to cause 
punctuations, might kurtosis decrease over time? Does kurtosis track volatility?  
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Figure 3.9 plots the inter-quartile range of the percent change values across all 66 budget 
categories for each year of data on the left-axis, while the right shows annual levels of l-
kurtosis7. This replicates the general decline in volatility noted by Jones et al. in 1998; note 
however the surge in volatility corresponding to the 2009 stimulus bill. The l-kurtosis statistic, 
while also volatile, shows no clear decreasing trend. The estimated best fit lines for both 
measures support the visual interpretation. As the coefficients (included in the legend to the 
figure) indicate, l-kurtosis declines only marginal with time, while volatility decreases at a 
relatively steep rate. The is reassuring that the high kurtosis observed in budget data is not a relic 
of a previous era, but persists even as a greater proportion of the budget is determined by 
spending formulas. Kurtosis statistics require many observations to be robust, so authors have 
shied away from estimating them, for example, on 60 annual series. When I do so as in this 
figure, it is with some caution and with a goal of estimating whether the trend is sharply 
downwards, as is volatility. The answer is that volatility has been declining progressively over 
time, but kurtosis has remained steady. 
  
                                                 
7 The figure uses inter-quartile range rather than a direct measure of variance as it is robust 
against the extreme outliers pervasive in budget data.  
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Figure 3.9. Tracking the Annual Inter-quartile Range and L-kurtosis of Percent Changes Values 
in the U.S. Budget, 1947 to 2009 
 
 
Discussion 
Punctuated equilibrium is an increasingly popular approach to understanding policy 
change, not just in a budgetary context, but across a range of organizational outputs. Given the 
explanatory power of this idea, its wide assimilation through the literature, and its prominence in 
this dissertation, it is important to be sure that its central empirical findings are robust. Here I 
have identified what could be a major concern: that the dichotomy between incremental and 
punctuated changes that the theory explains as the result of shifting political commitments, is in 
fact artifactual. The counter-hypothesis is that we observe incrementalism because much of the 
budget is tied to slow-moving demographic indicators, and we observe punctuations because 
certain budget categories are linked to highly stochastic input series. Combining these factors 
with a distributional approach would produce leptokurtosis, but not through the mechanism 
identified by punctuated equilibrium theory. After conducting various robustness tests I can 
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report that this concern is unfounded. Removing potential sources of measurement bias from the 
data does little to alter the shape of budget distributions and the same predictive elements remain 
statistically significant. Further, the finding of high kurtosis is robust with respect to time; it 
remains high even as mandatory spending makes up a larger proportion of the budget.  
 The findings from the chapter contribute beyond the support they lend to punctuated 
equilibrium theory. Most important is the discovery that many of the punctuations observed in 
government budgets are short-lived and see reversals within only a few years. Given the large 
proportion of such cases, and in line with the question that John and Bevan (2011) addressed in 
their paper, one could wonder whether the distributional approach to the study of punctuations 
simply has too much error built into it to be worthwhile. My analysis suggests that the findings 
remain robust even when we recognize and control for relevant causal processes that could 
generate significant numbers of “false” or temporary punctuations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: REVENUE POLICY: A CASE STUDY IN COMPLEXITY  
Chapter 2 looked at specific indicators and governing conditions as causes of policy 
instability. A more general set of indicators that decision-makers may clearly take into account 
when constructing budget plans is revenues. Federal decision-makers are concerned about 
deficits, even if they are not required to maintain a balanced budget. However, most states have 
balanced budget provisions. Few have studied kurtosis in tax revenues, but these may be a 
powerful predictor of the observed and well-known kurtosis in outlays. The availability of 
revenue is closely associated with economic fundamentals. Ideally taxes are designed to grow at 
least as quickly at the economy, while insulating governments from economic shocks. Tax 
revenues therefore represent something of a middle ground in the budgetary process – an output 
of the policy making process, they are directly affected by economic conditions and serve as an 
input to expenditure decisions.  
 The chapter leverages the central role revenues play in budgeting to test various 
hypotheses about government information processing. A central finding of the chapter is that like 
outlays, revenue distributions are ‘fat tailed.’ A comparison of revenue distributions to 
underlying changes in the economy reveals clear evidence of the ‘ratchet effect’ whereby the 
inefficiencies of policy making transform inputs into fat tailed outputs. Given the political 
difficulties of adjusting tax rates, we can expect that policymaking will be especially contentious 
when it comes to raising revenues. Consistent with this hypothesis, distributions of changes in 
revenues tend to be more extreme than outlay distributions. Furthermore, variance in the degree 
to which changes in state outlay distributions display extreme values can be explained, in part, 
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through revenue distributions. In all, an examination of government revenues provides a clear 
and novel demonstration of the punctuated equilibrium framework at work.   
Revenue Distributions 
The chapter employs data on government revenues from two sources. Data on federal 
revenues comes from the OMB, which tracks federal receipts from taxes as well as money 
received from custom duties, sales of various assets, and other financial transactions, from 1934 
through 2011. For the state-level analysis, the chapter uses a U.S. Census Bureau dataset that 
tracks state revenues from 27 different types of tax from 1965 through 2008. Figure 4.1 shows 
the distribution of annual changes to revenues received by the federal government, revealing that 
revenues, like outlays, form leptokurtic distributions. 
Figure 4.1. Federal Government Revenues, 1934 to 2011  
 
Figure 4.2 plots the l-kurtosis values associated with the revenue distributions for all 50 
states. For each state, this value is well above the 0.123 associated with the normal distribution; 
ranging from 0.407 (South Carolina) to 0.983 (Connecticut). So at both the federal and state 
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levels, revenue distributions show high kurtosis. This is not surprising as the policies that 
determine how taxes and other sources of revenue will be collected are subject to same 
information processing that leads to patterns of under and over-reaction in outlays. Instability in 
revenues can be seen as a particularly problematic feature of modern government. Figure 3.1 
reveals that in some years the revenues associated with certain federal taxes decreased by upward 
of 50 percent. The large l-kurtosis values associated with state-level distributions indicate that 
changes of a similar magnitude are relatively common among the 50 states as well. In many 
cases these dramatic negative shifts may represent a catastrophic failure in revenue, which would 
certainly impede the government’s ability to implement public policy or make reliable budget 
plans.  
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Figure 4.2. L-kurtosis of Revenue Distributions for the 50 States, 1965 to 2008 
 
 Chapter 2 showed that instability varies widely across policy domains, with areas based 
on relatively simple indicators showing fewer punctuations than those domains that are based on 
unstable or controversial inputs. The Census Bureau dataset tracks revenues from 27 different 
taxes employed by the states, so I follow a similar line of inquiry with the revenue side of 
budgets by measuring the leptokurtosis of each tax distribution, aggregated across all 50 states. 
The data includes revenues from all of the major taxes employed by the states – sales, property, 
income – as well as more esoteric categories that do not see wide usage, such as ‘amusement 
taxes’ which are sometimes included as admission charges for recreational events. Figure 4.3 
displays the results.  
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Figure 4.3. Leptokurtosis of State Taxes 
  
 Clearly some taxes are much less likely to see an extreme change in the amount of 
revenue they provide than others. Particularly stable taxes are the general sales tax, motor fuels 
tax, and corporate income tax. On the other side of the scale are the property and amusement tax, 
which with very high l-kurtosis values, undergo frequent punctuations. When designing a tax, 
state legislatures are interested in the amount of revenue it will generate, but also how stable that 
revenue will be over time. It is much easier to base long-term budget plans around predictable 
taxes, than on taxes that see high variability from one year to the next. Further, certain taxes may 
be linked to particular expenditure items. For example, in most states property taxes pay for 
public education. The high level of l-kurtosis associated with property taxes can help explain 
why many states find it difficult to adequately fund their public schools. Most of taxes in Figure 
4.3 are only small contributors to overall state revenues, however. High instability for these 
relatively minor taxes should have little effect on state budgeting. Notably, the two largest 
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sources of revenue for most states are the individual income tax and the sales tax, which have 
comparatively low l-kurtosis values. 
From Economic Fundamentals to Revenues  
The amount of revenue a government receives in a given year is highly dependent on 
economic fundamentals. Individual and corporate income taxes vary according to the business 
cycle; when unemployment is low, governments receive more revenue through these taxes than 
when unemployment is high. The sales tax, a major source of tax revenue, is also highly 
correlated with economic conditions, as people buy fewer consumer goods during economic 
downturns. Government revenue is therefore another area of policymaking where it is relatively 
straightforward to compare distributions of outputs with inputs, in order to directly assess the 
effects of disproportionate information processing.  
 Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) show that aggregate changes in stock market returns 
approximate a normal distribution. Instead of stock markets, the chapter looks at Gross Domestic 
and Gross State Product as measures of underlying economic conditions. As with markets, 
however, aggregate measures of economic productivity are based on the collective actions of 
many individuals and businesses, so we can expect that changes to GDP or GSP will be closer to 
the normal than distributions of outputs that are based on governmental decision-making. 
Economic conditions clearly affect the availability of government revenues, but ultimately, 
revenues are determined by public policy. By comparing the shape of economic and revenue 
distributions, the chapter can assess the degree to which government deliberations increase the 
instability of outputs, beyond what could be expected based on the inherent instability of a 
particularly relevant input.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the l-kurtosis associated with economic and revenue distributions for 
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the 50 states, and in the last row of the figure the federal government. In all but 3 cases the 
distribution associated with government revenues is more extreme than the corresponding 
economic distribution. This is evidence of the ‘ratchet effect’ where the inefficiencies of 
government (both cognitive and institutional) transform an input into a fat-tailed output.  
Figure 4.4. Comparing the Shape of Economic and Revenue Distributions for the 50 States and 
the Federal Government 
 
In each case, the government receives a mix of tax revenues based on economic activity 
and rates of taxation, but economic activity evolves slowly, which eventually puts strains on the 
budget. There are strong reasons to expect that governments will not be able to adjust the tax 
rates proportionately to these shifting fundamentals. Instead, the system may be allowed to limp 
along until a more dramatic adjustment takes place or a sudden crisis forces a change. As Figure 
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4.4 makes clear, some states have revenue distributions with much greater l-kurtosis values than 
others. One possible explanation is that each state relies on different economic fundamentals, for 
example relying on mineral extraction taxes in some cases but broad personal and corporate 
income taxes in others. However, Figure 4.4 shows no clear relationship between instability in 
economic fundamentals and the l-kurtosis of revenue distributions. There is no reason to expect 
that each state, or the federal government, will be equally efficient in shifting its many tax rates 
in order to maintain stability in receipts, so the variance observed in Figure 3.4 may only 
tangentially relate to differences between state economies.  
            As discussed, high l-kurtosis in revenue distributions is evidence of what in many cases 
would be a catastrophic drop in receipts. Figure 4.4 shows that, far from insulating governments 
from economic shocks, revenue policies appear to exacerbate the changes taking place in the 
underlying economy. In almost every case, government revenues undergo extreme changes far 
more frequently than would be expected from shifting economic conditions alone8.  
From Revenues to Expenditures   
Revenue policy provides a direct avenue for testing ideas about complexity and 
instability. As sticky as expenditure decisions may be, changing tax rates is even more politically 
difficult. Revenues are of course essential to the functioning of government and implementation 
of public policy, but taxes are deeply unpopular. It is therefore with great reluctance that decision 
makers will seek new avenues for raising revenue. On the other hand, cutting taxes, while 
politically popular may be fiscally untenable, especially among the states that to varying degrees 
                                                 
8 High l-kurtosis values also mean dramatic upticks in revenues, as the fat tails extend in both 
directions, so sometimes receipts grow at a much faster rate than economic fundamentals. States 
try to implement taxes that will produce more revenue over time and dramatic increases in 
receipts can certainly be a boon for state budgets. But implementing these taxes is a high-risk, 
high-reward strategy. Taxes that produce large positive punctuations are also more likely to see 
dramatic changes in the opposite direction.   
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require balanced budgets. Further, economic cycles often take policymakers by surprise, so there 
is a great deal of real-world uncertainty to contend with. If economic models were better at 
predicting the course of the nation’s economy, or there was more political consensus over tax 
rates, then setting revenue policy would be relatively simple. As it stands, given the comparative 
complexity – both natural and political – of setting revenue policy, the expectation is that 
distributions of changes in government revenues will be prone to greater instabilities than 
distributions of government outlays. 
 Figure 3.5 tests this hypothesis, comparing the l-kurtosis of revenue and expenditure 
distributions for the 50 states and the federal government. In 42 out of 51 cases, revenues have 
higher l-kurtosis values than expenditures. Some governments will be more or less efficient at 
adjusting revenues than others, which may explain why the results do not unanimously support 
the hypothesis, but the bulk of cases show the expected relationship. Revenues consistently see 
more punctuations – both positive and negative – than expenditures.  
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Figure 4.5. Comparing the Shape of Expenditure and Revenue Distributions for the 50 States and 
the Federal Government 
 
Predicting Stability in Government Expenditures   
While the size of federal and state budget deficits indicates that the link between revenues 
and expenditures is far from ironclad, scholarship does suggest that the availability of revenue 
affects spending decisions at the national and state level (Friedman 1978; Manage and Marlow 
1986; Ram 1988; Blackley 1986). This is especially true for the states, where balanced budget 
amendments require some level of correspondence between the two sides of the budget9 
Revenues, aside from providing an avenue for testing hypotheses about government information 
                                                 
9 The details of balanced budget amendments vary considerably across the states. Some merely 
provide procedural incentives to maintain balanced budgets, while others make it a constitutional 
requirement. 
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processing, may also be a powerful predictor of kurtosis in government outlays.  
           The chapter estimates a model using OLS regression to predict variance in the l-kurtosis 
of state expenditure distributions. (The dependent variable is on display in Figure 4.5.) The key 
independent variable is the l-kurtosis of state revenue distributions and the predication is simply 
that greater leptokurtosis in revenue will be associated with higher l-kurtosis in spending. Four 
additional variables of substantive interest are included in the model.  
           The first is a categorical variable that divides the states into quintiles based on the mean 
size of their expenditures. We might expect that states with lower mean expenditures will see 
more extreme changes in spending, as it is comparatively easy to make large adjustments to 
programs receiving fewer total dollars. For instance, a 100% increase to a program with a base 
expenditure level of $100 is, in total dollars, several orders of magnitude less substantial than a 
100% increase to a program with a base of $1 million. On the other hand, states with higher 
mean expenditures tend to be larger, with diversified populations and industries. Heterogeneous 
states may place greater demands on the information processing capacity of governments, 
exacerbating the dichotomy between incrementalism and punctuations.  
Another factor that might affect the l-kurtosis of expenditure distributions is economic 
fundamentals. Much of this effect may be indirect, as shifting economic conditions have 
immediate implications for state revenues. A direct effect between GSP and expenditures is also 
possible, however. Policymakers might anticipate changing economic fortunes and adjust 
spending levels before the new economic reality manifests itself in revenues. The model includes 
a variable for the l-kurtosis of GSP distributions, with the expectation that greater instability in 
economic fundamentals will lead to instability in expenditures.   
            Starting in the 1960s state legislatures began to professionalize, leading to longer 
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legislative sessions and endowing legislators with resources – both fiscal and organizational – to 
facilitate the process of lawmaking. Professionalization is essentially an effort to increase the 
agency of legislators, allowing them greater access to information and expertise (Mooney 1995). 
Of course, not every state has a ‘professional’ legislature. The model includes a categorical 
variable that divides state legislatures into fully-professional, semi-professional, and non-
professional based on demarcations provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL 2009), with higher values indicating a more professional legislature. As 
professionalization is closely linked to the capacity of decisions makers to process information, 
the expectation is that states with professional legislatures will see fewer spending 
punctuations10.   
             Finally, the model includes a categorical variable measuring the strictness of state 
balanced budget amendments, with higher values indicating stricter requirements. Once again the 
NCSL provides a three-tiered demarcation to distinguish between the states. Generally, states 
with the strictest amendments prohibit carrying debt forward across fiscal years, require that the 
governor propose a balanced budget, and that the legislature pass a balanced budget. The states 
with the least stringent amendments may have an amendment requiring the governor to submit a 
balanced budget, but do not demand that the legislature actually pass a balanced budget (NCSL 
2010). The strictness of balanced budget amendments may clearly affect the relationship 
between expenditures and revenues, so it is an important control to include in the model. Table 
4.1 shows the results.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The professionalism of state legislatures is mostly constant over time, with states only rarely 
changing categories.  
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Table 4.1. Predicting L-kurtosis of State Expenditure Distributions 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Expenditure Quintiles 0.06* 0.02 
Revenue L-kurtosis 0.24* 0.11 
GSP L-kurtosis 0.01* 0.44 
Professional Legislature -0.10* 0.03 
Balanced Budget Amendment -0.02* 0.02 
Constant 0.03* 0.03 
N = 50 
Adjusted R2 = 0.193 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
 
 Three of the five substantive variables are statistically significant. States with higher 
mean expenditures tend to have expenditures distributions with fatter tails, although the effect is 
only modest. This may be due to the increased complexity brought on by the diversity of policy 
considerations in larger states. At the very least, the results are reassuring that variance in l-
kurtosis is not caused by extreme changes among states with low total expenditures; a statistical, 
but theoretically uninteresting possibility. As expected, the coefficient for l-kurtosis in state 
revenue distributions is positive and significant. Clearly revenues deserve to be part of the on-
going discussion in the literature about the causes of punctuations in government outlays. 
 The coefficient for the l-kurtosis of GSP distributions is not significant, indicating that 
economic fundamentals do not have a direct effect on patterns of state spending (although they 
may certainly have an indirect effect through revenues). Likewise, the coefficient for balanced 
budget amendments is both very modest and statistically non-significant. But legislative 
professionalism has a powerful effect on the shape of expenditure distributions; states with more 
professional legislatures are less likely to see spending punctuations. This result has both 
theoretical and practical implications. It provides a relatively direct test of the theory of 
disproportionate information processing Jones and Baumgartner advance. Professionalism is 
closely linked to legislatures’ capacity to process information, so the finding is supports a basic 
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prediction of the theory. Second, it advances the discussion about the merits of 
professionalization, as budget instabilities are often seen as undesirable and professionalism can 
be viewed as a partial solution to this problem. 
Discussion 
The chapter advances the study of information processing and instability in American 
politics in two ways. First, the chapter demonstrates that l-kurtosis in state revenue affect the 
shape of spending distributions. At face value, the result is not surprising, as the link between 
revenues and expenditures at the state level is well-recognized. However, this connection has 
gone unexplored in the literature on punctuated equilibrium, which focuses predominantly on 
budgetary outcomes, but has never attempted to incorporate the revenue side of budgeting. As it 
happens the well-documented instability in expenditures can be closely linked to revenue policy. 
Of course, disproportionate information processing can be seen as the root cause of instability in 
both cases, but any attempt to explain punctuations in government spending must take seriously 
the possibility that many extreme changes are simply a reaction to evolving revenue policies. An 
investigation of government receipts also provides a window into what is a highly complex area 
of policymaking. The chapter documents a corollary between complexity and instability such 
that increasing complexity can be linked to more dramatic policy changes.   
 Second, the analysis provides a general test of punctuated equilibrium theory by 
comparing the shape of expenditure distributions across different conditions thought to influence 
a government’s aptitude to process information. Of particular relevance is the finding that 
legislative professionalism – a factor that relates directly to the information processing capacity 
of governments – is a powerful predictor of leptokurtosis in spending distributions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: PUBLIC INFORMAITON PROCESSING 
To this point, the dissertation has sought to explain the causes of instability in 
government policy. Now the focus shifts to another major component of the American political 
system – the public. In any functioning democracy, policymaking takes place at the intersection 
between representatives in government and their constituents, so there is a possibility that many 
dramatic policy changes are simply reactions to shifting public sentiments.    
 Mass publics are politically sophisticated - meaning that they respond to political stimuli 
such as presidential elections, wars, or major policy initiatives - because they gain by 
aggregation. Through aggregation, random behavior by people not paying attention to politics 
averages out, leaving a clear signal from those who are attuned and responding to political 
events. It would be difficult to overstate the importance this empirical fact has had for modern 
studies in public opinion. It is the bedrock on which electoral outcomes are predicted and the 
direction of public policies assessed; public opinion is an indispensable explanatory variable. 
Beyond sophistication, what else do we know about the characteristics of mass publics? 
Surprisingly little, given the powerful influence they exert on political outcomes. By 
incorporating literature on bounded rationality, I develop a model of public information 
processing. The key theoretical argument is that because cognitive limitations are relatively 
constant there is little to gain by aggregation, so public agendas, the scope of issues to which the 
public attends, will be highly constrained.         
 The implications appear quite substantial. The punctuated equilibrium model establishes 
a direct corollary between agenda scarcity and political instability, and bounded rationality is the 
 83 
 
centerpiece of this model; causing governments to under-attend to most issues and over-react to a 
small set of issue where a crisis seems apparent. If my model of public information processing is 
correct, then we should observe a similar pattern in public opinion. I use public policy mood, as 
developed by James Stimson (1991), to test this expectation. Analysis of public mood in relation 
to media coverage reveals that when attention is concentrated, there is the possibility for large 
surges in opinion, but in the absence of attention movement in opinion is only marginal. If public 
attention is a scarce commodity, then movement in opinion will be predominately incremental, 
with occasional punctuations on issues where attention is focused.     
 This finding supports previous scholarship, which characterizes opinion change as, 
alternatively, smooth and gradual, or sudden and dramatic. The benefit of the chapter’s approach 
is that an understanding of how cognitive limitations constrain the scope of public attention can 
account for both types of opinion change, offering a concise and unified explanation of 
movement in public opinion. Most important, the results advance the conversation about the 
nature of mass publics by establishing that, although sophisticated, they are still boundedly 
rational. Both characteristics are important for understanding opinion change. By responding to 
political stimuli the public plays an important role in representative democracy, but agenda 
constraints mean that opinion change is inherently dichotomous; publics will either behave 
idiosyncratically on issues that fail to cross some threshold of urgency or respond dramatically to 
those that do. Public responsiveness may be sophisticated, but it lacks precision.     
 The chapter unfolds as follows: the first section reviews scholarship relating to public 
opinion, paying particular attention to existing models of opinion formation and change. The 
second section introduces two hypotheses about patterns of change in public opinion, clarifying 
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the type of empirical evidence we should observe if they are verified. The third section tests the 
hypotheses using public policy mood in conjunction with data on media coverage.    
Opinion Formation 
The Converse-Zaller model of opinion formation proposes a two stage process. For 
opinions to change, new information must first be received and then accepted. Receiving a 
message requires both exposure and comprehension, while acceptance means adjusting one’s 
opinions to match the content of the message. So the likelihood of a person changing their 
opinion is a function of the probability that she receives a message and then accepts it (Converse 
1962; McGuire 1969; Zaller 1993). This process is conditioned by political awareness. Higher 
levels of political awareness increase the probability of someone receiving a message (as 
becoming informed about politics requires a person to pay attention to political messages in the 
first place). At the same time, higher levels of awareness make people less likely to accept a 
message (as well informed individual tend to have more concrete political values and 
expectations).  
In a later publication John Zaller (1991) adds nuance to the two stage model by 
considering how mixed messages and political values affect the likelihood of opinion change. He 
demonstrates that variance in the strength and consistency with which people hold their political 
beliefs can be attributed to the interaction between levels of political awareness and the relative 
intensities of competing political messages. Depending on the context, people with low levels of 
political awareness may be more likely to change their opinion than their highly aware 
counterparts (Zaller 1991). 
  These individual level findings have implications for understanding changes in 
aggregate public opinion. Only some of the public has to change their opinion for movements in 
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aggregate opinion to appear orderly (i.e. responsive to elections, public policies, and other 
political stimuli) (Stimson 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 1999; Erikson, MacKuen and 
Stimson 2002). This can be explained through aggregation gain, where random fluctuations in 
the opinions of uninformed citizenry average out, leaving a clear signal from the minority of 
citizens who are actually paying attention and responding to political stimuli (Stimson, 1991, 
2004). Different groups will be paying attention to different issues. Based on research by Zaller 
we can expect that the question ‘who moves public opinion’ will have different answers 
depending on contextual circumstances, such as the tone and intensity of media messages and the 
amount of elite discourse.  
Numerous articles consider the nature of changes in public opinion. In a 1982 article, 
Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro conclude that within their dataset, “Most changes were 
gradual. Only rarely did preferences fluctuate back and forth to a statistically significant extent 
within a short period” (1982, 40). Indeed, the basic dichotomy from the Converse-Zaller model 
suggests that opinions may be relatively stable, as change requires people who are politically 
aware enough to receive messages, but not so politically aware as to have inflexible political 
beliefs (Zaller 1992). James Stimson, in his 1991 Public Opinion in America, argues that the 
public is largely indifferent about most policy changes. He infers a ‘zone of acquiescence’, 
within which the costs of staying informed about public policy outweigh the potential benefits to 
the public. So while movement in public opinion is orderly, it is also notoriously slow to respond 
to political stimuli and not very sensitive. Of course, some messages resound louder than others, 
so sometimes even people with low levels of political awareness will receive the message. In 
these cases we can expect more dramatic movements in opinion (Zaller 1993). As Stimson 
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theorizes, policy making that takes place outside the zone of acquiescence can lead to serious 
backlash and sudden surges in public opinion. 
Public Information Processing 
Scholars of opinion change document evidence of both incremental drift and sudden 
surges in opinion. These findings resonate well with results in the literature on agenda setting, 
where policy change is thought to be a predominantly static process that is occasionally 
punctuated by episodic adjustments. My argument is that these similarities are not coincidental, 
but have a common root in bounded rationality, which causes attention scarcities in both cases.  
            In many ways models of opinion and policy change are similar, with both traditions 
placing a priority on attention. Without first attending to a message, systematic change is 
impossible. Both traditions are also careful to acknowledge that attention is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for change. As the Converse-Zaller model makes clear, people can receive a 
message but then choose to reject it, and issues often make it on the government agenda only to 
end in deadlock. Central to the punctuated equilibrium model is the idea that cognitive and 
institutional limitations make the government a disproportionate processor of information, 
creating widespread attention scarcities. Can we apply the same logic to the public? On the one 
hand, public information processing is not limited by institutional bureaucracy. Opinions can 
change as dramatically and frequently as people choose to change them. There are, however, 
good reasons to expect that cognitive limitations will apply to the public at least as strongly as 
they apply to governments.   
My model of public information processing is straightforward. Taking what we know 
about bounded rationality and applying the principals of aggregation gain implies that the public 
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agenda will be highly constrained.11 Why is this? Why do mass publics gain sophistication 
through aggregation, but not agenda space? The key is variance or a lack thereof when it comes 
to attention. People have dramatically different levels of political sophistication, but bounded 
rationality is ubiquitous. This means that the scope of each person’s agenda is relatively constant, 
and there is nothing to gain when aggregating over a constant.      
 As illustration, imagine a survey asking every American to list issues they are concerned 
about, in no particular order. In accordance with bounded rationality, we can expect that each 
respondent will list five to ten different issues (and probably not 100 or 1,000 different issues). 
Across every American a wide range of issues will be represented, but upon aggregating an 
orderly signal will emerge, with the frequency of issue responses rising and falling in accordance 
to contextual circumstances. In other words, responses will not be evenly distributed, but rather 
cluster around a small subset of issues to which particular urgency is attached. Critically, because 
cognitive limitations are universal they will survive the aggregation process, constraining the 
number of issues that can be considered highly salient. In all, the scope of the public agenda will 
closely resemble the scope of individual agendas.      
 Note, however, that the content of the public agenda should be sophisticated, in the sense 
that it will reflect contemporary political issues. But the number of issues on the agenda that can 
be considered salient should be limited to approximately 5 to 9; the number of unique issues 
cognitive psychologist estimate people can attend to at one time. A constrained agenda means 
that public attention will inevitably be a scarce commodity. For those issues that are the focus of 
the public’s limited attention, substantial shifts in opinion will be possible (although by no means 
                                                 
11 As noted, the public agenda, as we use the term, refers to the public’s issue priorities, the 
subset of politically salient problems to which the public attends. Issues on the public agenda can 
be considered ‘highly salient’, meaning simply that they are issues of prominence to the public. 
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guaranteed). Most issues, however, will not make the public agenda and will go under-attended. 
For these issues public opinion may drift marginally, but in the absence of attention, it is hard to 
imagine how large systematic shifts would be possible. Of course, issues can become more or 
less salient over time, but while the subset of highly salient issues can change, the number of 
issues on the public agenda should be relatively stable, so issues will displace each other as they 
rise and fall in urgency. 
Hypothesis 1: Public opinion will match a punctuated equilibrium pattern of change, where 
predominantly incremental shifts are occasionally interrupted by large changes. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in opinion will follow attention, with large changes being more likely for 
issues that are highly salient to the public. 
 
 If the first hypothesis is to be confirmed, then the distribution of changes in public 
opinion must feature very wide tails and a tall central peak, with mid-level changes largely 
absent from the data. This would indicate that changes to opinion are mostly incremental, but 
that occasionally dramatic surges in opinion take place. Confirmation of the second hypothesis 
would show that movement on the public agenda predicts the magnitude of opinion changes.  
Data and Analysis  
The analysis uses public policy mood as a measure of public opinion. Introduced by 
James Stimson in his 1991 Public Opinion in America, public mood is created by aggregating 
survey questions to isolate respondents’ latent attitudes about the size of government. These 
attitudes reduce to a single dimension – more or less government, with higher mood values 
indicating a public that wants more government intervention and lower values a public that 
favors a diminished role for government. An advantage of public mood is that aggregating across 
multiple surveys minimizes the effects of survey error, allowing a more accurate assessment of 
public opinion. Previously this measure has been used by James Stimson in various publications 
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(1991; 1995; 2002; 2004). The general mood measure is also available broken down into 44 
specific policy topics, which track opinions over varying periods of time between 1946 and 
2012. Breaking the general mood measure into its component parts allows a larger-scale 
assessment of the distribution of changes over time. Altogether, there are 1,584 observations 
(Data available on policyagendas.org). 
 As an example, Figure 5.1 displays public policy mood for mass transportation (left 
panel) and assistance for low-income families (right panel), two out of the 44 available topics. 
The mood measure can vary from 0 to 100, with 0 being the most conservative possible mood 
and 100 the most liberal. In the left panel, however, the measure varies only from approximately 
67 to 86, indicating the public strongly favors more government intervention when it comes to 
developing mass transportation systems. The story is very different when it comes to assistance 
for low-income families. Mood fluctuates between 37 and 57, suggesting that the public is less 
enthusiastic about government interventions to help struggling families.   
Figure 5.1. Public Policy Mood for Mass Transportation and Assistance for Low-income 
Families 
a) Mass Transportation    b) Assistance for Low-income Families  
 
  
  
 Taking the annual percentage changes in mood for each of the 44 topics and aggregating 
them together produces the distribution on display in Figure 5.2. Clearly the distribution is not 
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normal, but instead features the high central peaks and wide tails indicative of a leptokurtic 
distribution. (Superimposed over the mood distribution is a normal distribution, for comparison.) 
This is borne out by the l-kurtosis value, which at 0.527, is well above the value associated with 
the normal distribution. 
Figure 5.2. Annual Changes in Public Policy Mood, 1946 to 2012  
a) Mood Distribution     
 
 
 The evidence points clearly toward public opinion (as measured by public policy mood) 
following a punctuated equilibrium pattern of change. Most changes are only  
incremental, but occasionally the public drastically adjusts its expectations of government. 
Finding support for the first hypothesis, the chapter turns to the second. Do large changes result 
from a concentration of attention on a particular topic? Do opinions drift when attention is 
diffuse? 
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Measuring the Public Agenda 
The chapter uses levels of media coverage as a proxy for the public agenda with the 
expectation that issues receiving high levels of coverage are likely to be highly salient to the 
public.12 The approximation is not perfect, as it is conceivable that media and public agendas 
will sometimes differ (Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980). However, as a long series of 
scholarship makes clear, public opinion and media coverage are closely related, with the 
intensity and tone of coverage thought to influence movement in public opinion (McCombs and 
Shaw 1972; Cook et.al. 1983; MacKuen 1984; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987; Kellstedt 
2003; Barabas and Jerit 2009). Further, both the public and media react to the same stochastic 
events, such as wars, government spending, or elections. So there are good reasons to think our 
expectation is realistic.   
 Media coverage is measured using LexisNexis keyword searches, which allow 
researchers to track the appearance of certain words or phrases in news stories over time. A chief 
concern when using this approach is the viability of the search terms, or the degree to which they 
return coverage relevant to the topic of interest while passing over extraneous stories. The more 
specific or esoteric a topic, the easier it is to develop meaningful keywords. Out of the 44 topics 
for which mood data is available, 12 were selected, through trial and error, as sufficiently narrow 
to develop viable keywords. In developing search terms, more emphasis was placed on avoiding 
false hits than on covering the full range a topic. To test the viability of the terms, random 
                                                 
12 Previous scholarship uses Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP) poll as a measure of the 
public agenda (Miller et.al. 1976; Jones 1994; Soroka 2002). This classic polling series asks 
survey respondents to name the most important problem facing the country, thus providing a 
relative measure of the importance the public places on different issues. There are however some 
well-established limitations to the MIP poll, the most serious of which is that it is ambiguous 
what the word ‘important’ actually means to respondents (Wlezien 2005). The other 
consideration that makes MIP data unsuitable for the current analysis is that the traditional 
coding of the MIP responses aligns poorly to available public policy mood topics. There are 
simply not enough congruent topic areas for robust time series analysis.  
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samples of the results were read and if more than 15% of the sampled articles were extraneous to 
the topic, the terms were rejected and new ones developed. If after multiple iterations of this 
process no search terms could be found that brought the proportion of false hits below 15%, then 
the topic was rejected for this analysis. For example, there is data on the public’s mood about 
“elementary and secondary education,” but there are so many dimensions to this topic that 
developing accurate search terms is very difficult. Journalists talk about this issue in hundreds of 
distinctive ways. On the other hand, it is more straightforward to develop search terms for the 
“unemployment rate” because the vocabulary associated with this issue is relatively specialized.  
 The final keywords were used to search LexisNexis for stories in The New York Times 
from 1980 through 2010. This source was selected for its national prominence and because 
LexisNexis maintains electronic records for The New York Times through 1980. Many studies 
use The New York Times as an indicator of trends in national news, and there is evidence that 
coverage in other prominent sources tracks well with coverage in the Times (Althaus et.al 2001; 
Soroka 2002; Woolley 2000). A list of the 12 topics, related keywords, and the number of stories 
associated with each topic is available in the appendix. 13 LexisNexis includes articles to the 
present day, but the searches here are limited to 2010 because that is the last year public mood 
data is available for the 12 topics in question. Tracking the number of stories about each topic 
                                                 
13 Questions can always be raised over the competing merits of different keywords and a central 
concern is that they will fail to adequately cover the range and depth of a policy topic. To test the 
robustness of the findings the appendix to this chapter repeats the analysis using a measure of 
media coverage that does not rely on keyword searches. Amber Boydstun, in Making the News: 
Politics, the Media, and Agenda Setting (2013), coded the front page of every New York Times 
from 1996 through 2006, recording the policy topic of each story. After matching policy topics 
across coverage and public mood, the appendix replicates the analysis and finds no substantive 
difference from the results based on LexisNexus searches.   
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over time makes it clear that coverage is not evenly distributed. Of the 12 topics, some routinely 
generated hundreds of stories a year, while others rarely exceed 20 stories annually. 
 Figure 5.3 provides an example of the expected dynamic between attention and opinion. 
The figure compares changes in public mood about health care reform (on the left axis) to Times 
coverage of the same topic (on the right). Here we see that annual coverage of comprehensive 
health care reform in the Times is usually sparse, drifting between 0 and 200 articles a year, but 
during the early 1990s and late 2000s, coverage of this topic increases dramatically. At the same 
time, public mood about health care reform drops precipitously, indicating that the public feels 
the government should be ‘doing less’ about this issue. The dotted horizontal lines, which 
indicate two standard deviations in mean for percent change in public mood, reveal that the 
changes in mood that occur during the two periods of heightened coverage are by far the largest 
shifts in mood occurring at any point in the time series.  
During these years the government was debating whether or not to enact health reforms, 
so the Times was covering this issue for a good reason. We can say that health reform, which for 
the most part is paid little attention, rose to sudden prominence for a few short years, followed by 
an equally rapid decline. 14 In this way, the figure illustrates the dichotomy between incremental 
drift in opinion when attention is scarce versus dramatic changes when attention is concentrated. 
The example is also illustrative in that the ultimate outcomes of the Clinton and Obama health 
reform initiatives were very different, but in both cases the magnitude of opinion change was 
                                                 
14 For health care reform, attention is correlated with negative movement in opinion, indicating a 
public that prefers a diminished role for government on this issue. The relationship between 
attention and opinion change works in the other direction as well. For example, coverage of 
failing schools, dilapidated infrastructure, or poor health outcomes may provoke the opposite 
reaction from the public.  
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similar. This demonstrates that levels of attention can affect movement in opinion absent any 
actual policy adjustment by government.   
Figure 5.3. Comparing trends in Media Coverage and Public Policy Mood for Health Care 
Reform, 1980 to 2010 
 
 To expand the analysis beyond health care reform, I define topics as ‘highly covered’ in 
any year where a story about that topic appeared in the Times at least two out of three days, on 
average. Having set this basic definition, the analysis is straightforward. I test if the size of 
opinion changes is larger for issues that are highly covered. Table 5.1 provides the answer by 
showing the results of a difference of means test between the magnitudes of opinion change 
across the two coverage conditions.15 The results indicate that moving from periods of low to 
high coverage corresponds with an almost two-fold increase in the average magnitude of opinion 
changes. The related t-statistic is significant with a p-value of less than 0.05.  
  
                                                 
15 Other definitions for a highly covered topic are considered in the appendix, but the results are 
substantively unchanged. 
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Table 5.1. Mean Magnitude of Opinion Change by Media Saliency 
Media Saliency Observations Standard Deviation Mean Change 
Low 276 4.47 4.13 
High 82 8.69 7.98 
Note: t-value = -5.34 (significant at 0.05 p-value) 
  
Figure 5.4 displays the probability density distributions of aggregate changes in public 
mood for periods of low and high media coverage. Holding the range of the axes constant across 
distributions highlights notable differences. Shifts in mood on topics receiving low levels of 
coverage are predominantly incrementally. On the other hand, the distribution associated with 
highly covered topics has much wider tails, indicating that opinions on these topics are prone to 
large swings. Figure 5.4 provides visual evidence consistent with the results in Table 5.1. The 
magnitude of opinion change can be linked to attention, with large changes taking place where 
attention is concentrated and marginal changes where attention is diffuse. 
Figure 5.4. Probability Density Distributions of Aggregate Changes in Public Policy Mood, by 
Media Coverage 
a) Low Coverage         b) High Coverage 
  
   
 
 
 Table 5.1 and Figure 5.4 establish a correlation between amounts of coverage and the size 
of opinion changes. The chapter estimates an error correction model to determine if there is a 
causal relationship as well. While previous scholarship demonstrates that the tone and intensity 
of coverage can predict changes in opinion, the inquiry is typically if media content influences 
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the direction of opinion changes. The dependent variable in the model is the magnitude, or 
absolute value, of opinion change, as the goal is to determine if amounts of coverage affect the 
size of shifts in opinion, regardless of the direction those shifts may take. The independent 
variable is the number of New York Times articles on a topic in a given year.16  
   The model uses median regression and is designed to assess both short-term and error-
correction causality, with the coefficient for the differenced variable speaking to short-term 
effects and the coefficients for the lagged variables the long-term, or error-correction, effects.17 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient for lagged opinion change indicates that the 
public mood series is autoregressive, meaning that a surge in opinion in one year quickly 
deteriorates over proceeding years. The coefficient for differenced articles is positive and 
statistically significant, while the coefficient for lagged articles is positive, but not significant. 
This indicates that the quantity of coverage has a short-term effect on the size of opinion changes 
only, which is as expected. The public can react quickly, but has a short-term memory, so last 
year’s news stories do not affect movement in public opinion today.  
                                                 
16 An additional independent variable that may have relevance to the size of opinion change is 
government spending. The model does not include a measure of spending because the topics 
used in the analysis do not correspond very well to Office of Management and Budget spending 
programs. It is therefore difficult to match government spending with the relevant opinion series. 
Furthermore, the extent to which the public is even aware of government spending reallocations 
is often contingent on media coverage. As the example in Figure 5.4 illustrates, media coverage 
can be more important to public opinion (at least in the short-term) than actual spending levels. 
The Clinton health care initiative failed and resulted in no new spending, while the Obama 
initiative resulted in sizeable reallocations. In both cases, the magnitude and direction of opinion 
change was the same.   
 
17 Regression by ordinary least squares is particularly sensitive to outliers, so variables with 
many extreme values should be used with caution in conjunction with this technique (Fox 1991; 
Knoke and Bohrnstedt 1982; Harden and Desmarais 2011). Median regression, which is robust 
against outliers, may provide a useful and more efficient estimator in these cases. Median 
regression is similar to OLS, but instead of regressing toward the mean the model regresses 
toward the variables’ median values. 
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Table 5.2. Predicting Magnitude of Opinion Change  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Opinion Change(t-1) -0.48* 0.03 
Δ Articles 3.70* 0.96 
Articles(1,000) (t-1) 1.18* 0.61 
Constant 0.93* 0.30 
 N = 346 
Pseudo R-squared = 0.133 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
 
A one-unit increase in the article variable corresponds with 1,000 additional Times 
articles. The causal effect of coverage on opinion change is therefore modest, with each 
additional 1,000 articles corresponding with an approximately 3% increase in the magnitude of 
opinion change. The sample, however, is limited to 12 topics. The largest absolute value of 
opinion change across those topics is 40% and the mean magnitude of change is 5%. Meanwhile, 
in some years over 5,000 articles were published about a topic and the average level of coverage 
for a topic was 610 articles per annum. In the case of comprehensive health care, coverage went 
from fewer than 100 articles in a year to over 8,000 and under these circumstances the model 
would predict at 24% shift in opinion. In this context, the size of the coefficient for articles is not 
trivial.  
Discussion 
The model of public information processing the chapter develops advances the study of 
mass publics by emphasizing that although sophisticated, they are also boundedly rational. An 
understanding of how basic limits to human cognition affect mass publics can explain why 
changes in public opinion are prone to both incrementalism and sudden surges. While these 
tendencies have been noted previously, the chapter’s contribution is to integrate both types of 
change into a larger theoretical framework, illustrating that opinion changes are inherently 
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dichotomous; marginal and idiosyncratic where attention is absent and, potentially, dramatic 
when attention is concentrated.  
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PRIVATE SECTOR, MARKETS, AND THE SDEARCH FOR 
STABILITY   
The General Punctuation Hypothesis makes a broad claim - that changes to the outputs of 
any complex human decision-making process will be characterized by both incrementalism and 
sudden disequilibria. This claim has been tested extensively when it comes to government 
outputs. A rigorous test of the hypothesis must look well beyond governments, however. 
Organizational decision-making is obviously widespread outside the public-sector, so it is 
possible that the well-documented kurtosis in government outputs is actually unique to 
governments and not indicative of human-decision making at large.   
Under what circumstances would proportional decision-making be more likely? 
Governments, and especially national governments, are faced with an exceedingly complex task, 
but if we direct the search for proportionality away from governments toward organizations 
faced with a much smaller problem space, then bounded rationality might not be such a limiting 
factor. Further, previous scholarship has documented that market outcomes show very low 
kurtosis and, as I discussed in Chapter 1, there are good empirical reasons to expect that in many 
cases collective outcomes based on the decision-making of multiple independent actors will be 
more stable than outcomes from centralized decision-making processes.  
            The chapter proceeds along these lines, searching for cases of stable change distributions 
where outcomes are based on markets and among organizations faced with relatively 
straightforward goals. Finding such a distribution would present a challenge to the General 
Punctuation Hypothesis, demonstrating that in some circumstances human decision-making is 
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not characterized by punctuations. The size of the challenge, however, would depend heavily on 
the length and breadth of the search. If it turns out that normally distributed outputs abound, but 
that a collective focus in the literature on governments has obscured what is in fact a common 
occurrence in the private sector, then we would have to seriously rethink the merits of the 
General Punctuation Hypothesis (and probably rename it the Conditional Punctuation 
Hypothesis). On the other hand, if the search turns up empty, or if normally distributed outputs 
can only be associated with organizations of such limited scope that few are likely to exist, then 
we can be confident that the General Punctuation Hypothesis adequately describes the bulk of 
human decision-making.  
Collective Outputs 
The apparent rarity of normally distributed outputs in politics is something of an irony, 
given the abundance of such distributions in the natural world. As discussed in Chapter 2, many 
inputs to government policymaking may be based on natural processes, which are often normally 
distributed. Figure 6.1, for example, shows the distribution of aggregate changes to the average 
monthly temperature in Los Angeles from 1881 through 2006 in the right-panel, while the left-
panel tracks actual temperature levels over the same time period18. With an l-kurtosis value of 
0.113 this distribution comes very close to the normal, which has an l-kurtosis of 0.123. This fact 
is not immediately apparent from simply observing the left-panel where, without smoothing, the 
time series looks erratic.  Processes may appear to be moving stochastically or without any 
apparent order, but still form normal distributions when outputs are assessed collectively.  
 
 
                                                 
18 This data is collected by regional weather stations and made available by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Temperatures are listed in degrees Celsius.  
 101 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Average Monthly Temperature in Los Angeles, CA from 1881 through 2006 
a) Degrees Celsius      b) Aggregate Temperature Changes  
 
 Figure 6.2 gives another example of a process that approximates the normal distribution. 
The right-panel is an aggregation of monthly changes to atmospheric carbon dioxide levels and 
the left-panel tracks the same data from 1959 through 201219. Looking at the left-panel we again 
see considerable variance over time - like temperature, carbon dioxide levels fluctuate seasonally 
- and in this case there is also evidence of an upward trend. Even so, aggregate changes in carbon 
dioxide come very close to the normal distribution.  
 
 
                                                 
19 Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is measured in parts-per-million. The data is collected by the 
Mauna Loa Observatory and made available by NOAA.  
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Figure 6.2. Average Monthly Atmospheric CO2 Levels from 1959 through 2012 
a) CO2 Levels      b) Aggregate CO2 Changes  
 
 This brief review illustrates a large point – that many inputs relevant to policymaking will 
be normally distributed. What about outputs of policymaking, or human decision making more 
generally? The central prediction of the General Punctuated Hypothesis is that inevitable 
inefficiencies in human decision-making transform normal inputs into fat-tailed outputs.  
             In fact, normally distributed outputs are fairly common to human decision-making 
processes, so long as the process takes place over multiple independent decision-makers. A 
classic example, discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, are stock market returns, which in the aggregate 
approximate a normal distribution. Chapter 4 also showed that changes to economic 
fundamentals, which are based on the behavior of many independent actors, are much closer to 
the normal distribution than government outputs. But the result is not unique to economics and 
can often be found where outcomes are determined by the independent decisions of multiple 
actors. Figure 6.3 looks at air travel, showing aggregate changes in the number of monthly 
passengers in the right-panel and the total number of travelers over time on the left.  
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Figure 6.3. Average Monthly Number of Air Travelers from 1990 through 2006 
a) Number of Travelers     b) Distribution of Changes in Travelers  
 
 Rates of air travel are obviously based on human decision-making and while the 
distribution in Figure 6.3 is not exactly normal, it is much closer to the normal distribution than 
any previously explored government output. Figure 6.4 gives another example – the distribution 
of changes in monthly border crossings into the United States. This distribution, with an l-
kurtosis of 0.140, also comes close to the normal.  
Figure 6.4. Average Monthly Border Crossings into the United States from 1995 through 2006 
a) Number of Crossings       b) Distribution of Changes in Crossings   
 
It would seem that outputs of human decision-making often conform to the normal 
distribution, or at least come very close. Early in the search for stable outcomes, a qualification 
to the General Punctuation Hypothesis presents itself: it applies predominantly to the decisions 
of a person or organization operating in isolation. That is, once we start aggregating across 
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autonomous decision makers, the Central Limit Theorem reasserts itself and the resulting output 
distribution will be approximately normal. This principal is well understood and likely comes as 
no surprise to Jones and Baumgartner, who published the original stock market result. Still, it 
remains an important caveat to the Hypothesis, as markets and other collective outputs play a 
major role in politics and society. Instability and punctuations do not inevitably result from 
human enterprise. 
Exchange Rates, the RGGI, and Airline Deregulation 
An example of the difference between collective and centralized decision-making 
manifests itself in the politics of exchange rates. The Foreign Exchange Market (FOREX) is the 
largest in the world, trading an average of $5.3 trillion each day (Bank for International 
Settlements 2013). Currency trading is clearly a major enterprise and represents an important 
component of most country’s monetary policy. There are, however, many strategies a country 
can employ to manipulate the price of its currency on the international markets. China, the 
highest-profile manipulator, artificially lowers the price of its currency by buying large quantities 
of U.S. dollars and aggressively selling its own currency. This cheapens the price of Chinese 
exports, effectively undercutting their international competitors. Objections to this type of 
manipulation are widespread. The U.S. maintains that it perpetuates a global trade imbalance by 
making it difficult for U.S. manufactures to gain a foothold in domestic and international 
markets. A more sweeping concern is that China’s policies are causing its economy to overheat 
and that a massive downturn is pending, unless efforts are made to stabilize its growth rate.  
 China is a blatant case, but currency manipulation can take many more subtle forms. The 
degree to which a country manipulates its currency is best thought of as a scale, ranging from the 
most flexible or freely traded currencies, to the least flexible, tightly controlled currencies. For 
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simplicity, the World Bank offers three general categories – free floater, floater, and 
manipulated. Countries with free floating currencies allow their currency to fluctuate according 
to the whims of the international market, while countries with manipulated currencies pursue 
strategies to artificially hold their currency at some specific pre-determined level.  
 This framework provides a natural experiment to test the differences between collective 
decision-making and isolated governmental decisions. We can expect that aggregate changes in 
the value of free-floating currencies will be normally distributed. On the other hand, the value of 
manipulated currencies is essentially a matter of public policy, and like most other public 
policies we would expect to see frequent punctuations. Currencies that the World Bank classifies 
as floaters should fall between these extremes.  
 Using historical exchange rate data for 40 countries, available online through the World 
Bank website, I test these expectations. For each country, the exchange rate relative to the U.S. 
dollar is tracked on an average monthly basis, from 1994 through 2013. Of the 40 currencies, 18 
are classified by the World Bank as manipulated, 15 as floating, and 7 as free floating. Figure 6.5 
shows the change distributions associated with each category, with the range of the y-axis held 
constant to facilitate comparison.  
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Figure 6.5. Aggregate Changes in Exchange Rates across Three Categories of Currency 
Manipulation 
a) Manipulated     b) Floating 
 
c) Free Floating 
 
 Manipulated currencies show a distribution with an l-kurtosis of 0.606, floating 
currencies have an l-kurtosis of 0.429, and free floating 0.198. These statistics indicate 
substantively important differences in the likelihood of a currency undergoing punctuations in 
value. This variance is not random, but meets prior expectations. When exchange rates are 
determined by markets, the resulting distribution is almost normal, but when government policies 
set the rate of exchange, punctuations occur frequently.  
 Is this direct evidence of inefficiencies in governmental decision-making leading to 
instability? Maybe, but a plausible counter-hypothesis is that countries that manipulate their 
currency tend to be less stable overall than countries with free-floating currencies. In other 
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words, perhaps systematic political instabilities among the manipulating countries would lead to 
punctuations in exchange rates even in a market context. After all, a country undergoing a 
violent regime change sends strong signals to the international community to divest from their 
currency.  
           Fortunately, there is an easy way to separate these causal explanations. The World Bank 
utilizes a ‘political stability index’ that ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with negative numbers 
corresponding to greater instability. Table 6.1 shows the results of an OLS regression predicting 
the l-kurtosis of exchange rate distributions, calculated separately for each of the 40 countries20. 
Two independent variables are included. One is the average political stability index score for 
each country from 1994 through 2012. The other is a categorical variable corresponding to the 
market flexibility categories, with a 1 indicating that the currency is manipulated and a 3 that it is 
free floating.  
Table 6.1 Predicting the L-kurtosis of Exchange Rate Distributions  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Market Flexibility  -0.08* 0.03 
Mean Political Stability -0.06* 0.02 
Constant  0.49* 0.07 
N = 40 
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.226 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value  
 
 Both independent variables are negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
punctuations in currency rates decrease relative to political instability and free markets. This is 
not surprising, but serves to illustrate the powerful distinction between outputs from collective 
versus centralized decision-making processes.  
                                                 
20 The appendix includes a table displaying the l-kurtosis of each country’s exchange rate.  
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Another example can be found in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
program, which creates a marketplace for power companies to buy and sell carbon credits, within 
9 Northeastern states. The goal behind the RGGI is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions as part of 
an effort to combat global warming. Under the initiative, carbon emissions must be paid for by 
the purchase of emission permits that are auctioned on a quarterly basis by the participating 
states. Over time, the idea is to decrease the total number of permits available for auction, thus 
reducing carbon emissions, with the overall goal of reducing emissions to 10% below their 1990 
levels. An additional benefit is increased revenues for the participating states.    
 Tracking carbon emissions over time is obviously important for the RGGI as a means to 
assess progress toward carbon reductions. The initiative provides data on the quarterly emissions 
of each power plant from the 9 participating states from 2000 through 2008, before the auctions 
begin, and then from 2009 to 2013 once the market system was in place. Altogether 230 power 
plants are represented in the data. The RGGI is concerned that the rate of emission has decreased 
between these periods; my interest is with the stability of changes in the amounts of carbon being 
emitted. Before the marketplace the amount of carbon released was largely within the purview of 
each individual power plant. Obviously economic considerations would affect the amount of 
carbon each power plant could generate on an annual basis, but the decision-making that 
governed carbon emissions was highly centralized. Once the RGGI was in place, the amount of 
carbon emissions became a function of market processes. This is not to say that centralized 
corporate decision-making has no role to play in the RGGI, as clearly corporations must decide 
for themselves how many permits to buy, but the market outcome is based on the interaction of 
these individual processes.           
 Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of annual changes in carbon dioxide emissions by each 
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power plant from 2000 to 2008 in the left-panel and the right-panel shows the distribution of 
changes from 2009 to 2013, after the RGGI was in place. The ranges of the axes are held 
constant to facilitate comparisons. While both distributions are leptokurtic, the l-kurtosis 
statistics tell a familiar story. Before the RGGI, when carbon emissions varied according to 
individual corporate decision-making, the l-kurtosis was 0.729. After the RGGI, when carbon 
emissions were a function of market processes, the l-kurtosis falls to 0.426.  
Figure 6.6. Comparing Changes in CO2 Emissions Before and After the RGGI 
a) Before, 2000 – 2008   b) After, 2009 – 2013 
 
 The RGGI case is telling because it shows how market decision-making can reduce 
instability beyond monetary returns. That is, the stabilizing effect of markets extends beyond the 
expenditures for carbon permits, affecting changes in the emission of carbon itself. Also 
noteworthy is that the RGGI is a government program, so carbon emissions can be considered a 
policy outcome, or at the very least an outcome directly affected by government policy. The 
example illustrates how governments can tailor policies to promote either centralized or market-
based decision-making and that this has real consequences for the stability of outputs.   
 As a final example, I consider airline yields before and after government deregulation of 
the industry. Prior to 1978 the federal Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated airline fares, 
routes, and schedules, treating the airline industry as a public utility. As the industry grew this 
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approach became less tenable and consumers protested the lack of competition, and subsequently 
high ticket prices and inconvenient routes. These efforts culminated with the passage of the 
Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, which quickly phased out the CAB’s ability to set fares and 
eventually eliminated the department altogether. This presents another opportunity for a case 
study: before deregulation airline fares were essentially a matter of public policy, after they were 
determined by market forces.  
 Historic data on actual ticket prices is unavailable, so instead I use a measure of the 
airline industry’s total ‘yield’, available from 1948 to 2012. Yield refers to the revenue per 
passenger mile earned by the industry. For example, if the airline industry earned $10 million in 
revenue in a year and produced 100 billion passenger miles (the total number of miles each 
airline seat traveled), then the industry’s yield is 10 million divided by 100 billion, or  10 cents 
per mile. Yield is essentially the value of an airline seat to the industry, so it serves as a 
reasonable substitute for ticket prices. Figure 6.7 compares the distributions of annual changes in 
airline yield before deregulation, in the left-panel, and after deregulation, on the right. 
Figure 6.7. Comparing Changes in Airline Yield Before and After Deregulation of the Industry  
a) Regulated, 1948 – 1978                   b) Deregulated, 1979 – 2012 
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Once again, we see that outputs stabilize after moving to a market system. When the 
airline industry was regulated by the CAB the change distribution shows an l-kurtosis of 0.425. 
After deregulation the l-kurtosis falls to 0.235. Holding the range of the axes on both figures 
constant highlights the transformation from one period to the next. The caveat to this analysis is 
that yield is only publicly available as an industry total, instead of on an airline-by-airline basis. 
As such, the total number of observations is relatively low, justifying some caution in the 
interpretation of the distributions21.   
The Private Sector 
The frequency of punctuations in organizational outputs is a function of how efficient an 
organization is at processing and responding to information. A consistent rhetorical theme in 
American politics is that the private sector is vastly more efficient than government. Clear goals 
– to make more money – and a limited bureaucracy are usually cited as factors giving private 
companies a comparative advantage. This perception, coupled with Americans’ deep-seated 
distrust of ‘big government’, make calls to privatize government programs a regular campaign 
slogan. 
             There are good reasons to be skeptical of claims that private companies will operate 
more efficiently than government. Pundits may have made up their mind, but the scientific 
                                                 
21 What is the difference between the collective outcomes observed in this section and the 
distribution of changes in public opinion I examine in Chapter 5? Mass opinion is assessed by 
aggregating over many independent actors, so why are changes in opinion highly punctuated? I 
suspect the answer is that political opinions are unlike other tangible items that are traded on 
commodity markets. We know that people have weak political opinions to begin with, so new 
information has the potential to cause major fluctuations. Most important, many collective 
outcomes are based on decisions by independent actors using very different bases of information 
and then acting in their own financial self-interest. The same is not true about political opinions, 
where media coverage will direct national attention toward a few high salient topics. That is, 
there is a tendency for the public to ‘discover’ the same issues in unison.  
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literature is less decided, with numerous articles reporting negligible differences between 
corporate and government effectiveness, or even giving an edge to government (Mohan and Ray 
2004; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Brewer and Brewer 2011; Camilleri and O’Callaghan 1998; 
Lan and Rainey 1992). From an agenda setting perspective, corporations are just another type of 
organization that will also suffer from cognitive and institutions limitations, albeit to varying 
degrees. Critically, there is a major difference between the information processing capacities of a 
market, as opposed to an individual business entity operating within a larger free-market system. 
There is no reason why any single company will be better at processing information simply as a 
virtue of being ‘tapped in’ to the market system. Rather, the ability of a company to process and 
respond to information will depend heavily on internal management structures and the scope of 
the business enterprise.  
 Still, the search for stability may benefit from a focus on the private sector. An advantage 
this perspective offers over previous scholarship, which focuses exclusively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
on government outputs, is that there is tremendous variance across the private sector, not only 
because there are many more businesses than governments, but also because the complexity of 
the underlying tasks varies widely across businesses. Governing, even at the local level, is 
complicated and given the volume of information that may be relevant to governing it is no 
wonder that it can only be processed disproportionately. As Chapter 2 made clear, however, 
some policy domains are more stable than others. Changes to Social Security and Medicare 
rarely saw punctuations, for instance. These programs are only two of the national government’s 
many concerns, so they exert little influence on the full distribution of changes in government 
outlays, but what if there was an organization whose only job was to process Social Security 
payments? We can easily imagine a company that, if not Social Security, has business interests 
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that are extremely narrow in scope, perhaps based on a normally-distributed underlying process 
where changes are easily predicted. In this case, where outputs would be closely tied to a 
normally-distributed process, bounded rationality might not be such a limiting factor.  
           To explore this possibility data on corporate expenditures is collected using Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings22. A range of industries is represented, from fast food 
(McDonalds), to insurance (Progressive), and furniture retail (Haverty’s)23. Each company 
breaks their expenditures into different annual categories. The longest time series is from 1991 
through 2012, with some companies having data for a shorter period of time. Figure 6.8 shows 
how changes to these annual expenditures are distributed, across time and companies.   
Figure 6.8. Aggregate Changes in Corporate Expenditures  
 
                                                 
22 Data is only available to publicly traded companies, which is unfortunate as many companies 
that are large enough to sell stock have diversified interests, complicating decisions concerning 
expenditures.  
23 The appendix lists each of the companies used in the analysis and the l-kurtosis of their 
expenditure distributions.  
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 With an l-kurtosis of 0.693 the distribution closely resembles distributions of government 
outputs – both feature tall central peaks and fat tails. Clearly the private sector is not any better at 
producing stable outputs than the government, at least not across the 18 companies under 
consideration here. What if we break the distribution in the figure apart and consider an 
individual company?  
The Union Pacific Railroad 
The Union Pacific Railroad is one of the oldest and largest railroad companies in the 
country, operating over 30,000 miles of track in the Western United States. It specializes in 
moving freight – a broad category encompassing almost everything except pets and people – 
around the country (Union Pacific Corporate 2011). Operating in the railroad business certainly 
has its fair share of complications. Anything in the way of environmental hazards, new 
government regulations, or evolving competition from rival companies will pose potentially 
major challenges to traditional ways of doing business. But with all that, a firm the size of Union 
Pacific, being the largest rail operator in the United States, can expect that demand for its service 
– shipping freight – will be closely linked to general economic fundamentals. When the economy 
is doing well, more freight, in the form of raw manufacturing materials and finished consumer 
goods, needs to be moved around the country. During economic downturns, there is less 
consumer demand, corresponding to fewer items that need to be shipped.  
             Figure 3.4 from Chapter 3 showed that distributions of GSP and GDP tend to have 
relative low l-kurtosis values and the expectation is that the distribution of changes in the amount 
of freight being shipped will look very similar. The Department of Transportation provides 
access to data compiled by the Association of American Railroads, a lobbying group 
representing major rail operators, on the amount of freight shipped in the United States by rail 
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from 2000 through 2013 on a monthly basis24. Figure 6.9 shows the distribution of monthly 
changes across this dataset and, with an l-kurtosis value of 0.270, its shape closely resemble 
distributions of changes in economic fundamentals. Also note, in the left-panel, the dramatic 
drop-off in the amount of freight being shipped corresponding with the start of the 2008 
recession.  
Figure 6.9. Monthly Freight Shipped by Rail in the United States from 2000 through 2013 
a) Freight Shipped          b) Distribution of Changes in Freight Shipments  
  
             From this we can infer that the demand seen by Union Pacific for its service is relatively 
uniform25. This is not to say that change never happens. As the left-panel of Figure 5.7 makes 
clear some visually-striking movement in freight shipments have taken place in recent history. 
But even the largest of these changes (the drop in early 2008 corresponding to one of the worst 
recession in U.S. history) only amounts to an adjustment of about 13 percent. The right-panel 
figure illustrates that most changes over this time period are only modest in size. Having such 
reliable demand may greatly simplify the internal budgetary process that Union Pacific 
                                                 
24 These amounts are expressed in terms of the Transportation Services Index, which is an 
economic measure of freight movement throughout the United States introduced by the Bureau 
of Transportation Statistics. The key quantities that form the basis of the index are the number of 
carloads and ‘quarterly ton-miles’ of freight shipped by rail each month.  
 
25 The alternative assumption would that there is pent-up demand for shipping that rail operators 
are simply unable to meet, so that the distribution of changes in freight shipped only loosely  
reflects actual levels of demand. 
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management undergoes each year. Contrast the scope and quality of information relevant to 
Union Pacific’s decision making with an industry where demand is much more fluid and 
unpredictable. Determining how to allocate money toward products and services may be 
altogether more difficult for firms in the fashion industry, for instance.  
             Figure 6.10 shows the distribution of changes to expenditures by Union Pacific from 
1994 to 2012, across 4 distinct spending categories. The associated l-kurtosis is 0.278, which is 
only slightly above the value associated with the distribution of freight shipments. Clearly then, 
the magnitudes of changes to Union Pacific’s expenditures closely mirror changes to underlying 
economic fundamentals and overall freight shipments.  
Figure 6.10. Aggregate Changes in Expenditures by Union Pacific Railway from 1994 to 2012 
 
 Does Union Pacific provide an example of proportional information processing? Its 
expenditures are not normally distributed, but they do closely approximate the shape of the 
distribution of relevant inputs. At the very least, it would seem that Union Pacific is quite adept 
at adjusting expenditures in correspondence to the size of underlying demand. This is similar to 
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what I found in Chapter 2, which showed that outlays on Social Security tracked changes to the 
over-65 population. The distinction here is that Union Pacific is a full organization, rather than 
an isolated issue-domain within a larger organizational structure. In all, we have come a long 
way from the examination in Chapters 2 and 4 of public budgets, which showed governments 
transforming normal inputs into fat-tailed outputs.  
Discussion 
The chapter began by suggesting that the discovery of an organization that could process 
information proportionally would present a challenge to the General Punctuation Hypothesis, but 
that the size of the challenge would relate to the breadth of the search. So just how rare are 
companies like Union Pacific? On the one hand, even simple tasks can become complicated 
quickly as new areas of conflict or competition are discovered. Furthermore, the distribution in 
Figure 6.10 only looks at expenditures made by Union Pacific in the recent past. The company 
has existed since the 1850s, so it is possible that if more data had been available from the SEC 
the distribution would tell a very different story – one that might include hostile takeovers of 
other railways or contentious managerial turnovers.  
           On the other hand, the current search has been limited to publicly traded companies, 
which are the only ones required to submit SEC filings. Most companies large enough to trade 
on the stock market have diversified interests, greatly complicating and increasing the range of 
information relevant to producing an operating budget. A justification for looking at the private 
sector is to focus on organizations with a very narrow scope or purpose, but attempts to ‘drill 
down’ in scale quickly encounter data limitations. It may be that many small, privately owned 
companies can engage in more proportional information processing.     
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 A major contribution of the chapter is to introduce the distinction between market-based 
and centralized decision-making as powerfully conditioning the stability of outcomes. It has long 
been recognized that market outcomes are relatively stable, as compared to governmental 
outputs. What previous scholarship left unnoted is that many areas of government policymaking 
are based directly on market outcomes. Beyond governments, society makes wide use of 
markets, so this represents an important exception to the claim that human decision-making 
inevitably results in highly punctuated outputs.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the instabilities of political outcomes vary 
systematically according to two factors a) the complexity of issue domains and b) the centrality 
of decision-making processes. When issues are comparatively simple, or organizations base 
outcomes on a market structure then changes are smooth and gradual. As issues become more 
complex and decision-making is centralized, then changes come is a series of fits-and-starts, with 
predominately marginal adjustments punctuated by dramatic changes.  
The implications of these findings are substantial. First, they offer valuable nuance to 
punctuated equilibrium theory. Previous scholarship uses the theory to explain an observation – 
that political outcomes show frequent punctuations – and while important, there was little work 
dedicated to explaining variance within that outcome. Why do some organizational outcomes 
show more or fewer punctuations than others? Why does instability vary across issue domains? 
Most seriously, this deficit in the literature left a basic prediction of the theory untested – can we 
observe instabilities varying with attention such that attention scarcities correlate with 
punctuations? Ultimately, the test of a theory must lie in its ability to make successful 
predictions. My research has found that attention does seem to be a crucial factor that can 
explain political stability – both issue complexity and market-based decision mechanisms relate 
directly to the capacity of organizations to attend to new information. In summary, punctuated 
equilibrium theory passes the test; a basic prediction is met. 
My research, however, also presents a cautionary tale to anyone expecting political 
instabilities to be pronounced and inevitable. I documented many cases where, with simple 
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issues and market-based structures in place, political outcomes change only gradually with time. 
Further, these conditions are not particularly rare within government, and relatively common 
taking a broad view of human enterprise. These observations are not hostile to the General 
Punctuation Hypothesis; rather, because they occur where attention is least scarce, they can be 
seen as exceptions that prove the rule. Still, given the emphasis in the literature that government 
decision-making will always results in punctuated outcomes, it is important to note that large 
areas of policymaking – monetary policy for instance – are not particularly unstable.  
My research also invites a second look at the idea that the shape of output distributions 
has a great deal to tell us about government efficiency. The underlying logic – that inputs 
relevant to governing should be normally distributed so outputs that deviate from normal indicate 
sub-optimal policymaking – is sound. But a key finding from Chapter 2 was that many 
punctuations appear to be in response to stochastic crises. If scientists at NOAA have trouble 
accurately predicting the occurrence, duration, and path of hurricanes, then we can hardly expect 
policymakers in Washington to do any better. In other words, the level of precision necessary for 
governments to be comprehensive information processors far exceeds anything that exists in the 
world’s most powerful supercomputer. From this perspective, I have argued that punctuations 
can be a seen as a good thing, in the sense that we cannot reasonably expect our governments to 
foresee ever crisis, but can expect that they will respond dramatically to those crises when they 
occur. Divorcing the study of political instability from evaluations of efficiency does nothing to 
diminish this field of study, instead it encourages practical assessments of the ways in which 
policymaking is or is not successful. Most important, it forces researchers to take a closer look at 
the inputs relevant to governing in order to determine how governments respond to problems 
across different issue domains. 
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 Areas for further research are plentiful. Punctuations in government outputs are well-
documented, more recent scholarship shows similar patterns of change in media coverage 
(Boydstun 2013), and my research shows that changes in public opinion are likewise unstable. 
This raises the tantalizing possibility that punctuations could be traced through the political 
system. Do punctuations in spending originate as dramatic shifts in public opinion? Do spikes in 
media coverage precipitate spikes in spending and opinion? Can we establish the existence of a 
national agenda where the government, media, and public all attend to the same issues at the 
same time? This line of research has implications for understanding the causes of political 
instability and also the relationship between three major components of the political system.  
Another area for additional research is to further investigate the link between various 
input series and agenda setting dynamics. We can expect that the process of agenda setting is an 
interaction between policymakers, public opinion, and the severity of problem indicators. For 
example, Democratic presidents may wish to focus on unemployment or income inequality – 
issue domains closely associated with the Democratic Party’s platform – but if indicators suggest 
that these problems are getting better, it would be very difficult for a president to make the case 
that these are issues worthy of attention. In all, the process by which issues land on the agenda is 
complex and the literature is far from a fully specified model of agenda setting. My research 
advances the discussion by showing that the stability of policy outcomes varies substantially 
according to the relevant inputs, but this only a first step for integrating inputs into agenda 
setting models. The next step would be to determine how policymakers respond to problem 
indicators and how this response is conditioned by the severity of underlying problems.  
Finally, interview and field-work based research may be highly useful in assessing 
differences across issue domains in the range of indicators—quantitative and qualitative—that 
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are actually used in government decision-making. As discussed, it is often difficult for 
researchers to link indicators with particular budget categories, or policy outcomes. One obvious 
possibility to surmount this difficulty would be to survey policymakers and simply ask what 
indicators they pay attention to. This approach would be beneficial for practical reasons – 
because it would help researchers determine what indicators to associate with what policies – but 
also theoretically – as it would be interesting to see if instabilities are more likely when there is 
widespread disagreement over the relevant indicators. A lack of field-work is a significant gap in 
the literature on the causes of punctuations, or in validating the conceptual model with 
observations of the process of decision-making in governmental settings.  
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APPENDIX 2.A: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATION  
 
Table 2.4 from Chapter 2 presents the results of a logistic regression predicting the 
occurrence of punctuations in federal spending. As a robustness test, this appendix re-estimates 
the model, this time as a cross-sectional time-series model with random effects, treating each 
budget category as the panel unit. This treatment allows me to control for attributes of the 
various budget categories that are unaccounted for by the independent variables. Furthermore, 
instead of using a dichotomous classification to distinguish between punctuations and changes of 
a smaller magnitude, the dependent variable is simply the absolute value of percent change in 
spending. Table 2.1A shows the results, which are highly consistent with the logistic model from 
the main text. In particular, the coefficient for subfunction complexity is still a powerful 
predictor of budgetary change.   
Table 2.1A Predicting Budgetary Change 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Lagged Absolute Percent Change 0.05* 3.47 
Dollars 0.00* 0.19 
Unified Government 8.10* 2.15 
House Polarization  -27.03* -0.91 
Honeymoon Period 2.11* 0.43 
Subfunction Complexity  1.12* 3.46 
Constant 28.84* 2.79 
N = 3,752 
R2 Within = 0.00 
R2 Between = 0.17 
R2 Overall = 0.01 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
APPENDIX 5.A: LEXISNEXIS KEYWORDS  
 
The table shows the LexisNexis keywords I use to assess media coverage in Chapter 5.  
 
Table 5.1A. Coverage of Policy Topics in The New York Times from 1980-2010, with 
LexisNexis Keywords 
Topic Total Articles Search Terms 
Unemployment Rate 563 
BODY(("unemployment rate"  OR 
"joblessness" OR "jobless rate") w/5 (United 
States OR U.S. OR America!)) 
   
Ethnic Group Discrimination  1,312 
BODY(("race" OR "ethnicity" OR "ethnic 
group") w/5 "discrimination") AND (U.S. OR 
United States OR America!)) 
   
Gender and Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination 
4,355 
BODY(("women" OR "sex" OR "sexual 
orientation") w/5 "discrimination") AND 
(U.S. OR United States OR America!)) 
   
Freedom of Speech and 
Religion 
1,427 BODY("school prayer") 
   
Comprehensive Health Care 
Reform 
3,430 
BODY(reform w/5 ("health care" OR 
"Medicare") 
   
Employee Relations and 
Labor Unions 
1,801 BODY(NLRB) 
   
   
Mass Transportation 6,145 BODY("mass transit") 
   
   
Poverty and Assistance for 
Low-Income Families  
1,259 
BODY("Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children" OR AFDC OR "Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families") 
   
Urban Economic 
Development and General 
Urban Issues 
2,850 
BODY(urban w/5 (revitalization OR renewal 
OR sprawl OR "economic development")) 
   
Banking, Finance, and 
Domestic Commerce 
11,846 
BODY("Department of Commerce" OR 
"National Bureau of Standards") 
   
NASA , Government Use of 
Space, Exploration 
Agreements  
11,196 BODY(NASA) 
   
Research and Development 1,500 BODY("National Science Foundation") 
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APPENDIX 5.B: COMPARING DEFINITIONS FOR “HIGH COVERED”  
 
Chapter 5 defines a topic as highly salient if it appears in The New York Times at least 
two out of three days on average. Other definitions for high saliency are compared in Table 
5.2A. Less strict definitions correspond with weaker findings, but substantively the results are 
robust.  
Table 5.2A. Comparing Changes in Public Policy Mood during Periods of Low and High Media 
Coverage across Four Definitions of High Coverage  
Media Saliency Observations Standard Deviation Mean Change T-value 
Total 358 5.93 5.01 - 
Every Third Day 
Low 138 4.61 4.52 
-2.07* 
High 220 6.61 5.32 
Every Other Day 
Low 197 4.35 4.16 
-3.02* 
High 161 7.30 6.05 
Two out of Three Days 
Low 276 4.47 4.13 
-5.34* 
High 82 8.69 7.98 
Every Day 
Low 270 4.50 4.19 
-4.73* 
High 88 8.56 7.54 
* = significant at 0.05 p-value 
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APPENDIX 5.C: AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF MEDIA COVERAGE: THE NEW 
YORK TIMES FRONT PAGE 
 
In Chapter 5 I measure media coverage with LexisNexis keyword searches in an effort to 
assess the amount of attention given to various topics for which public policy mood data is 
available. While this approach is relatively common in the literature, there can always be 
discussion about the merits of certain keywords, and of particular concern is the possibility that 
some search terms are simply much better at targeting a particular issue than others. For 
example, using ‘NASA’ as a search term might go a long way toward measuring attention 
toward space flight and technology, but no similarly encompassing term exist for issues such as 
banking and finance.    
To allay concerns that the chapter results are specific to a particular coding system, this 
appendix replicates the results using a measure of media coverage that does not rely on keyword 
searches. In Making the News: Politics, the Media, and Agenda Setting, Amber Boydstun (2013) 
codes the front page of every New York Times from 1996 through 2006, recording the policy 
topic of each story. The advantage to this approach is that the data is comprehensive, so it avoids 
the potential measurement biases associated with LexisNexis keyword searches. Table 5.3A 
shows the total number of front page stories on each of the policy topics Boydstun codes for, 
from 1996 to 2006. 
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Table 5.3A. The New York Times Front Page Articles 
Topic Number of Front Page NYTimes Articles 
International Affairs and Foreign Aid 6,354 
Defense 4,479 
Government Operations 3,958 
Law, Crime, and Family Issues 2,088 
Health 1,799 
Sports and Recreation 1,273 
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 1,249 
Macroeconomics 964 
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties 914 
Education 912 
Arts and Entertainment 769 
Labor, Employment, and Immigration 749 
Space, Science, Technology and Communications 719 
State and Local Government Administration 715 
Transportation 594 
Weather and Natural Disasters 573 
Community Development and Housing Issues 410 
Environment 354 
Churches and Religion 329 
Energy 299 
Social Welfare 273 
Public Lands and Water Management  269 
Death Notices 268 
Other, Miscellaneous, and Human Interest 172 
Agriculture  168 
Fires 129 
Total 30,780 
 
 Public policy mood data is available for 15 of the topics from Table 5.3A, including most 
of the policy relevant issues and none of the news-specific topics such as ‘fires’ or ‘sports and 
recreation notices’. Table 5.4A shows the results of difference of means tests, measuring the 
magnitude of opinion changes during periods of high and low saliency. Three different 
definitions of high saliency are considered and the results are robust to where this line is drawn. 
Using an entirely different measure of media coverage does nothing to alter the findings. 
Opinion changes are substantially larger in size when topics are highly salient. 
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Table 5.4A. Mean Magnitude of Opinion Change by Front Page NYTimes Coverage  
Media Saliency Observations Standard Deviation Mean Change 
Low 137 4.55 3.84 
High (2 out of 3 Days) 28 8.82 11.06 
Note: t-value = -6.32 (significant at 0.05 p-value) 
Media Saliency Observations Standard Deviation Mean Change 
Low 125 4.48 3.69 
High (1 out of 2 Days) 40 8.25 9.38 
Note: t-value = -5.56 (significant at 0.05 p-value) 
Media Saliency Observations Standard Deviation Mean Change 
Low 101 4.85 4.12 
High (1 out of 3 Days) 64 7.49 6.56 
Note: t-value = -2.53 (significant at 0.05 p-value) 
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APPENDIX 6.A: KURTOSIS BY COMPANY 
 
Figure 6.1A shows the l-kurtosis of the expenditure distributions for each company used 
in the analysis from Chapter 6. Progressive Insurance’s expenditures come closest to the normal 
distribution, followed closely by Union Pacific, and with an l-kurtosis of 0.870, Goodyear is 
most likely to see major fluctuations in annual expenditure.  
Figure 6.1A. L-kurtosis of Expenditure Distributions for18 Publicly Traded Companies  
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